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I. INTRODUCTION-POLITICAL FIRESTORMS IN THE "LAND 
OF THE SNOWS" 
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The roof of the world, land of the snows, alleged home of the 
Abominable Snowman, and place for the timeless meeting of mountain 
and sky-these are the Western visions of TibeU Most Americans 
know little else about this strange and exotic land shrouded in histori-
cal obscurity. Modern Tibet is a curious stockpot of native Tibetans 
and immigrant Chinese, which until recently was seasoned with increas-
• Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. J.D., University of Connecticut; LL.M. 
and S.J.D., University of Virginia; Certificate in Mandarin Chinese, Yale University. The Author 
teaches International Business Transactions and Comparative United States-China Economic Law. 
He has visited China numerous times in recent years, and was in China on a three-month lecture 
visit when the United States House of Representatives passed the amendments to House Bill 1777 
on June 18, 1987, condemning China for alleged human rights abuses in China and Tibet. Several 
weeks later, he visited Tibet to conduct investigations for this study. The Author also was in Beij-
ing during the spring 1989 democracy demonstrations. The Author acknowledges with appreciation 
the research assistance of Rana Tiwari, Stetson Law Class of 1988. 
1. Tibet was the land used by James Hilton as a model for Shangri-La in the Utopian 1933 
novel, Lost Horizon, and Tibet continues to be romanticized by the press. See Unrest Rocks the 
Calm of "Shangri-La," U.S. NEws & WoRLl> REP., Oct. 19, 1987, at 10. 
(1) 
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ing numbers of Western tourists, backpackers of all ages, vagabonds, 
and visitors from neighboring NepaP 
On June 4, 1989, China's 27th Army brutally crushed democracy 
demonstrations that had extended for seven weeks in Beijing and other 
Chinese cities.3 This crackdown, which came to be known as the "Beij-
ing Massacre," was viewed with revulsion by the free world and resulted 
in economic sanctions by the United States, Japan, and Western Eu-
rope.• In contrast, China's activities in Tibet, which also have serious 
human rights implications, have received very little attention outside 
the United States. Most countries remained quiet about human rights 
violations in March 1989, when Beijing imposed martial law in Tibet 
and reportedly shot and executed protesters.5 The United States Con-
gress, however, has been openly critical of China's Tibetan policies. 
During 1987 Tibet became the focal point of souring United States-
China relations when Congress focused on the "Tibet Question" in con-
gressional action challenging the Chinese record of alleged human 
rights abuses in this obscure and remote land.6 Congress's denunciation 
of China soon was followed by an unprecedented appearance before 
Congress by the Dalai Lama, Tibet's god-king in exile. Soon thereafter, 
violent riots erupted in Lhasa, Tibet's capital city. The Chinese reacted 
bitterly, blaming the Dalai Lama for instigating the riots and members 
of the United States Congress for intervening in Chinese domestic af-
fairs. The controversy over the "Tibet Question" highlights the diver-
gence of opinions between the Congress and the executive branch over 
United States relations with China, and it provides a case study of the 
foreign policy dilemmas that emerge when these two branches of the 
United States government collide. This Article will explore the ramifi-
cations of these events, with particular attention to the impact on 
United States-China relations generated by the divergent approaches 
taken by the executive branch and Congress in dealing with China and 
the "Tibet Question." 
2. In 1987, according to official Chinese statistics, 43,500 foreigners visited Tibet and spent 
more than $15 million. Many of those tourists were backpackers who entered by land from China's 
Sichuan province or neighboring Nepal. Gargan, Beijing Is Said to Restrict Foreign Travel to 
Tibet, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1988, at A5, col. 1. 
3. See infra notes 177-95 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text. 
5. do Rosario, The Misrule of Law, FAR E. EcoN. REv., July 6, 1989, at 12. 
6. Representative Daniel Mica introduced amendments to H.R. 1777 that dealt with human 
rights violations in Tibet by the People's Republic of China. See 133 CONG. REC. H5218-20 (daily 
ed. June 18, 1987); see also id. at H5220-30 (congressional debate concerning the "Tibet 
Question"). 
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II. THE CHINESE PRESENCE IN TIBET 
The conflict between the Tibetans and their Chinese rulers has its 
roots in a separatist religious movement but also reflects concerns over 
human rights abuses. The failure to separate the two issues has clouded 
debate about them. The debate that rages over whether, as the Chinese 
claim, Tibet historically has been part of China's sovereign lands or 
whether, ~s the Dalai Lama claims, Tibet is a captive country, taken 
and held hostage by superior military forces against the will of the Ti-
betan people, has been viewed by most of the world for many years as 
an increasingly academic issue. Neither the United States nor any other 
member of the United Nations has recognized Tibet as a sovereign state 
independent of China.7 Most Western countries, including the United 
States, recognized China long after it had reasserted its rule over Tibet. 
China's early claims over Tibet predate the American Revolution,8 
but because of the perennial weakness of the Chinese government, 
those claims lacked credibility until the new Chinese Communist gov-
ernment launched its military initiative to reassert its sovereignty over 
Tibet in 1950.8 In the face of overwhelming military odds, the sixteen-
year old Dalai Lama opted for negotiations rather than conquest. A 
Seventeen Point Agreement recognizing the "peaceful liberation of Ti-
bet" by China was signed in May 1951 by the Dalai Lama's representa-
tives in Beijing, and the Dalai Lama himself subsequently signed the 
agreement and returned from his brief self-imposed exile in lndia.10 
The Agreement allowed a semblance of self-governance to continue 
under the Dalai Lama and guaranteed both religious freedoms and the 
continued use of the Tibetan language. Dominance by the Chinese mili-
tary was complete. 
Despite initial harmony in the new relationship, sporadic armed re-
sistance by Tibetans began to break out in 1954. The most notable re-
sistance occurred in the southeastern "Kham" region, where the fierce 
Khampa tribesmen battled with Chinese regulars, often with the assis-
7. Roy, Human Rights Situation of the Tibetan People, DEP'T ST. BuLL., Dec. 1987, at 49, 
51. 
8. China's Manchu Qing dynasty (1644-1911) conquered Tibet after nearly 1000 years of 
intermittent hostilities between the two countries. By the late nineteenth century Tibet had be-
come a sideshow in the rivalry between Britain and Czarist Russia for influence in south central 
Asia. In 1910 China's Qing Dynasty used its army to reassert control over Tibet. In 1911, however, 
the Nationalist revolution in China led to the collapse of China's control over Tibet. In 1913 the 
Dalai Lama declared Tibet independent. Nearly four decades of stable government under the feu-
dal theocracy of the Dalai Lama's reign followed, free from foreign interference. A History of Con-
flict, WORLD PRESS REV., Dec. 1987, at 20. 
9. See A. GRUNFELD, THE MAKING OF MoDERN TIBET 104-06 (1987). 
10. /d. at 106-07. 
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tance of monks and farmers. 11 The Chinese press continues to describe 
the uprising as one launched by "imperialists and a small number of 
reactionary elements in Tibet's upper ruling clique."12 Unable to deal 
with the crisis at home, the twenty-three year old Dalai Lama fled his 
summer palace, Norbulingka, in early March 1959 and sought refuge in 
India, the homeland of Tibetan Buddhism. From his Indian refuge, the 
Dalai Lama renounced the 1951 Tibet-China agreement and established 
his "government-in-exile."18 In 1965 China established the Tibet Au-
tonomous Region and installed as its head the same Ngapo Ngawang 
Jigme who had signed the 1951 Seventeen Point Agreement.14 
Since 1979 China has allowed the Dalai Lama to send six investiga-
tive missions to Tibet; several of those were led by close relatives of the 
Dalai Lama. During 1983 and 1984 discussions with the Chinese sug-
gested that the Dalai Lama himself might soon return to China for a 
fact finding trip. Positions hardened, however, in 1985, and the trip 
never materialized.16 
Part of the continuing tension occasioned by Chinese control of Ti-
bet has been based upon cultural differences between the Chinese and 
the Tibetans and the way they view "progress" under Chinese rule. For 
example, under the feudal theocracies that prevailed before 1959, the 
rate of illiteracy in Tibet was ninety-five percent. There were only thir-
teen primary schools and one secondary school in what is now the Tibet 
Autonomous Region. Today, 2388 primary schools and 64 high schools 
exist, and about 4000 Tibetan students study in interior China. The 
Chinese view these improvements as indicators of great progress. In 
contrast, Tibetans view these changes as attempts by the Chinese to 
propagandize communism, advance Chinese ways and language, and 
denigrate religion.18 
11. /d. at 128. 
12. Lobsang & Jin Yun, Tibet: History and Anecdoctes (II), BEIJING REv., June 27, 1983, at 
25, 29. 
13. See A. GRUNFELD, supra note 9, at 132. 
14. China is divided into provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under 
the Central Government. See CoNST. OF THE PEOPLE's REPUBLIC OF CHINA [1982] art. 30(1) 
(adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress and promulgated for imple-
mentation by the Proclamation of the National People's Congress on Dec. 4, 1982) [hereinafter 
1982 CONST.), English translation in 1 THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1979-1982) 
1, 11 (1987) [hereinafter LAWS 1979-1982). Other autonomous regions include Inner Mongolia and 
Xinjiang. National autonomous areas enjoy a measure of self-government, subject to final author-
ity of the Party and Central Government. /d. arts. 112-22, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-
1982, supra, at 28-30. 
15. Roy, supra note 7, at 49-50. 
16. /d. 
CHINESE HUMAN RIGHTS 5 
Ill. TIBET'S IMPORTANCE TO CHINA 
Why have the Chinese placed so much importance on this barren 
mountainous land that has remained so obscure throughout history? 
Tibet, about the size of Western Europe, is a dry and arid land clinging 
to the Himalayas, the highest mountain range in the world. It is largely 
undeveloped, with vast stretches of moonscape with hard rocky soil and 
thousands of glaciers, but very little economic development. In spite of 
its apparent economic unattractiveness, Tibet has been an enduring 
lure to Westerners and Easterners alike for centuries. In part the lure is 
one of curiosity for the exotic. Tibet is indeed a strange, exotic land of 
compelling raw beauty and isolated tranquility, with some historical ex-
ceptions. Trespassers in this "Land of Snows" have included occasional 
itinerant adventurers as well as formal military expeditions by Indian, 
British, Russian, and Chinese troops. Christian missionaries also ven-
tured into Tibet but made little dent in the pervasive influence of 
Buddhism.17 
Tibet does have an abundance of mineral resources that largely re-
mains untapped. However, the most enduring attraction that Tibet has 
held for governments is its location as a buffer zone between India and 
China. Bordering India, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Burma, Tibet 
serves the same role of strategic and military buffer state for China as 
the autonomous regions of Xinjiang in the west and Inner Mongolia in 
the north. Although de-emphasized by the Chinese press, China main-
tains a strong military presence in Tibet.18 The estimated hundreds of 
thousands of Chinese troops stationed in Tibet are there not only to 
counter perceived threats from without by states like India, but also to 
suppress opposition from within. The strategic military importance of 
Tibet to China was underscored within weeks of the October 1987 riots 
in Lhasa when China deployed a squadron of J-7 fighters to the Gong-
gar Airfield near Lhasa to counter Indian air force flights over the bor-
der and incursions into Tibet by India's Soviet-built MiG-25s.18 
Another reason for China's adamant position on Tibet is China's 
goal of consolidating those territories which it considers part of its his-
17. A. GRUNFELD, supra note 9, at 46. 
18. While visiting Tibet in 1987, even before the riots began, the Author observed military 
installations on the perimeter of Lhasa, and long convoys of troop transport vehicles with soldiers 
on the roads leading to the capital city. 
19. Covault, Chinese Deploy J-7 Fighters in Tibet to Counter Indian Threat, AviATION 
WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 19. 1987, at 103. J-7 fighters are versions of the sophisticated Soviet 
MiG-21 fighter plane. China also is using its newly acquired United States-built Sikorsky S70C 
Black Hawk helicopters to support military operations in Tibet along the disputed border between 
China and India. Black Hawk Helicopters Assist Tibetan Military Operations, AVIATION WEEK & 
SPACE TEcH., Oct. 19, 1987, at 104. 
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toricallegacy.20 Through wars, conquests, foreign invasion, and China's 
own imperial neglect, key areas of "old China" fell into hostile hands. 
Hong Kong was taken over by the British in 1842,21 Macao by the Por-
tuguese in 1557,22 and Taiwan by the fleeing Nationalist Army in 
1949.23 China considers Tibet to be among those regions justifiably 
within China's historical claims of sovereignty, and the current Chinese 
move to consolidate and reunite all of its sovereign lands magnifies Ti-
bet's significance. 
Agreements already have been reached with the colonial powers to 
restore Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997 and over Macao in 
2000. China's new "one country, two systems" policy was the key to 
successful resolution of the Hong Kong negotiations. China's leader, 
Deng Xiaoping, promised that although Hong Kong clearly would be a 
part of China subject to Chinese sovereignty, it could continue to oper-
ate as virtually a pure capitalist system for the next fifty years.24 
This "one country, two systems" concept obviously holds a certain 
appeal for those forces in Taiwan that long for reunification with their 
ancestral homeland. As the octogenarian Nationalist leaders, holdovers 
from Chiang Kaishek's days of battling the mainland Communists, dis-
appear from Taiwan's leadership scene, the possibility of reconciliation, 
perhaps someday leading. to reunification, appeared to be closer to be-
coming a reality by the time Taiwan's Finance Minister visited Beijing 
in 1989.211 The ongoing effort to reunite the Chinese mainland and the 
island of Taiwan, and the accompanying rhetoric of both sides, has as-
sumed a more moderate tone in recent years, perhaps in part as a result 
of increasing volumes of under-the-table economic relations between 
the two estranged Chinese republics.26 To the extent that the human 
rights issue is kept alive, r.r'aiwan's concerns about reunification will not 
be abated. The Beijing Massacre of June 1989 only served to exacerbate 
20. This legacy includes Tibet, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. 
21. The British took control over Hong Kong from China by the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, 
supplemented by the Convention of Peking in 1860, and a lease was concluded in 1898 granting 
Great Britain control over and use of the New Territories (adjacent to Hong Kong) for 99 years. It 
generally is conceded that all of these concessions were forced upon China by a superior military 
power. HoNG KONG IN TRANSITION 3 (J. Cheng ed. 1986). 
22. See MACAU: CITY OF CoMMERCE AND CuLTURE 10 (R. Cremer ed. 1987). 
23. See A. BARNETT. CHINA AND THE MAJOR PowERS IN EAsT ASIA 171 (1977). 
24. See Lee, One Country, Two Systems, Asian Wall St. J., May 7, 1987, at 8, col. 1. 
25. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text. 
26. Trade between China and Taiwan, principally through Hong Kong, reached $1.51 billion 
(United States dollars) in 1987, an increase of 58.7% over their 1986 trade volume. China, Taiwan 
Trade, Asian Wall St. J., Feb. 26-27, 1988, at 8, col. 2; see also Taiwan-China Trade Seen Surging 
to Record in Year, Asian Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1987, at 5, col. 1. By mid-1989 Taiwan was manifest-
ing a more relaxed attitude in general with respect to economic relations with Communist coun-
tries. See Taiwan to Expand Communist Trade, Asian Wall St. J., May 18, 1989. at 3, col. 1. 
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those concerns in Taiwan. 
IV. THE CHINESE REFORM MovEMENT AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE UNITED STATES 
7 
Although Tibet itself has very little commercial contact with the 
outside world, China has pursued an aggressive "open" policy since 
1978, encouraging tourism as well as trade and investment relations 
with the United States and other Western nations. Economically, the 
policy has been highly successful for both China and the United States. 
By 1987 the United States was second only to Hong Kong in direct 
investment in China and was China's third largest trading partner be-
hind Hong Kong and Japan.27 Strategically, the new United States-
China rapprochement has been one of the greatest successes in contem-
porary United States foreign relations. 
The sudden shift of Chinese policy, from one of isolationism and 
extreme ethnocentrism to open economic relations with the Western 
world and more conciliatory foreign relations, generally was made possi-
ble by the modernization program of Deng Xiaoping. Mao Zedong, 
China's charismatic revolutionary leader, "liberated" China in 1949 and 
subsequently led it for almost three decades on a sometimes tortured 
path of increasingly leftist political extremism. The notorious decade of 
virtual anarchy known as the "Cultural Revolution" (1966-1976) started 
by Mao to suppress his political opponents, spread havoc, death, and 
destruction throughout all of China and Tibet.28 The present govern-
ment led by Deng Xiaoping denounced the extreme leftism of the Cul-
tural Revolution soon after Deng assumed power. Four of the principal 
leaders of the Cultural Revolution, the notorious "Gang of Four" in-
cluding Mao's widow, were tried for their crimes soon after Mao's 1976 
death; all were committed to life in prison. 29 Most of the examples of 
repression cited by Congress in its 1987 condemnation of China were 
drawn from the pre-1976 period.30 To the extent that Congress had a 
proper role in the denunciation of the Cultural Revolution, the timing 
of its 1987 resolutions was late by more than a decade. 
27. NAT'L COUNCIL FOR U.S.-CHINA TRADE, U.S. JOINT VENTURES IN CHINA: A PROGRESS RE-
PORT 2 (1987). 
28. There are numerous accounts of the Cultural Revolution. Contemporary historian Paul 
Johnson places it in historical perspective in P. JoHNSON, MoDERN TIMES ch. 16 (1983). For per-
sonal accounts of the period by Chinese writers, see F. BUTTERFIELD, CHINA: ALIVE IN THE BITTER 
SEA (1982); NIEN CHENG, LIFE AND DEATH IN SHANGHAI (1986); SEEDS OF FIRE: CHINESE VOICES OF 
CoNsCIENCE (G. Barme & J. Minford eds. 1986). The damage caused by the wanton destruction 
and the fighting in Tibet was described by one authority as "awesome." See A. GRUNFELD, supra 
note 9, at 180. 
29. See generally D. BONAVIA, VERDICT IN PEKING: THE TRIAL OF THE GANG OF FOUR (1984). 
30. See supra note 6. 
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Beginning in 1978 the new Chinese leadership instituted a series of 
significant economic and legal reforms that have been accompanied by 
both political and human rights reforms. Early reforms in agriculture 
were the linchpin of China's economic recovery,81 and subsequent liber-
alizations virtually have transformed the communal system of agricul-
tural production to one of private ownership. The "responsibility 
system" in agriculture, which motivates workers by combining individ-
ual or group responsibility with greater opportunities for material re-
wards, proved to be so successful that it had been adopted by more 
th.an ninety-seven percent of agricultural accounting units by 1982.82 
Much of China's agricultural production today is accomplished through 
"household contract" arrangements between the state and families, an 
outgrowth of the responsibility system. Land is leased to an individual 
or household that assumes full responsibility for production, including 
risks of loss and prospects of gain. The lessee pays taxes and a land use 
fee but keeps profits from sale of the produce. 88 
Similar contract responsibility systems now are being introduced in 
Chinese enterprises to inspire greater productivity from a work force 
grown lethargic under the Communist system. 84 Labor law reforms have 
been extensive during the past decade as part of China's effort to in-
crease productivity. The movement from reliance upon ideological ap-
peals to motivate the workers to a system of material incentives has 
resulted in the reversal of many of Mao Zedong's extreme leftist 
policies. 811 
The United States-China relationship has experienced a virtual 180 
degree turn during the past decade. Following President Richard 
Nixon's historic visit to China in .1972, Deng Xiaoping visited the 
31. The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party met· in 1978 and identified agricultural reform as a major priority. Determined to over-
come the disincentives for individual initiative that were inherent in Mao Zedong"s collectivization 
of agriculture, the Committee gave authorization for the establishment of the new "responsibility 
system," which shifted responsibility for tasks or production to individuals or groups, accompanied 
by prospects for greater rewards if productivity was high. See generally Vause & Vrionis, Chino's 
Labor Reform Challenge: Motivation of the Productive Forces, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 447, 451-57 
(1988). 
32. WANG GUICHEN & ZHOU QIREN, SMASHING THE COMMUNAL POT: FORMULATION AND DEVEL· 
OPMENT OF CHINA'S RURAL RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEM 46 (1985). 
33. See generally A. KHAN & E. LEE, AGRARIAN POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN CHINA APTER 
MAo (1983). The percentage of average annual income of peasants derived from household con· 
tracts grew from 32.7% of total income in 1980 to 81.1% in 1985. 1986 CHINA AGRIC. Y.B. (Agricul-
tural Publishing House) 289 (English trans.). 
34. See Li Dewei, Jiang Jinyong & Gai Jianling, New Trend in Enterprise Reform, BEIJING 
REv., Apr. 4-10, 1988, at 23; Zhou Xiaochuan, Contract System in China's Enterprises, BElliNG 
REv., Apr. 4-10, 1988, at 22. 
35. See generally Vause & Vrionis, supra note 31. 
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United States in 1979.36 President Jimmy Carter increased the momen-
tum towards favorable relations by signing the Agreement on Trade Re-
lations . Between the United States of America and the People's 
Republic of China in 1979.37 The successful economic relations that 
subsequently developed between the United States and China encom-
passed both trade and investment. By 1987 trade between the United 
States and China reached ten billion dollars, an increase of twenty per-
cent over 1986.38 Although there have been some problems and neces-
sary adjustments as the relationship has developed,39 the trade 
relationship has been regularized and was expected to grow.4° For ex-
ample, a new four-year United States-China textile agreement signed in 
February 1988 further regularized the growing trade in the area of tex-
tile imports from China, a politically sensitive area for some members 
of Congress.4 1 At the time of this writing, the full effects of the Beijing 
Massacre and subsequent repression on United States-China trade are 
uncertain. 
Foreign investment has been embraced enthusiastically by China to 
infuse needed foreign exchange into the nation's economy. In 1979 
China passed an Equity Joint Venture Law42 which allowed foreign 
firms to have significant ownership interests in Chinese enterprises. 
American firms have been among the largest investors.43 More recently 
China passed the Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law44 which allows 
36. See generally [D]eng's Great Leap Outward, TIME, Feb. 5, 1979, at 24. 
37. Agreement on Trade Relations, July 7, 1979, United States-People's Republic of China, 
31 U.S.T. 4651, T.I.A.S. No. 9630. 
38. Yeutter Expected to Urge China to Open Markets Wider to U.S., Asian Wall St. J., Feb. 
1, 1988, at 1, coL 4. 
39. Protectionist forces in the United States have strengthened because of the United States 
trade deficit in the relationship. See Level of Trade Rises Between U.S., China, Asian Wall St. J., 
Jan. 28, 1988, at 3, coL 1. Other problems include China's concerns over United States limitations 
on export of sophisticated technology. Yeutter Expected to Urge China to Open Markets Wider to 
U.S., supra note 38, at 8, col. 5. 
40. Expected Rise in Trade with U.S. Underlines China's Growing Role, Asian Wall St. J., 
Dec. 18-19, 1987, at 5, coL 4. 
41. See China and U.S. Sign Textile Agreement That Limits Exports, Asian Wall St. J., 
Feb. 3, 1988, at 3, coL 1; see also China, U.S. Starting Talks in Washington on Textile Imports, 
Asian Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1987, at 12, coL 6. 
42. Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 
(adopted at the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 1979, promul-
gated by Order No. 7 of the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Con-
gress, and effective as of July 8, 1979), English translation in 1 LAws 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 
150. 
43. Wei!, China Market Still Attracting U.S. Firms, Asian Wall St. J., Feb. 12-13, 1988, at 8, 
coL 1. 
44. Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign-Capital Enterprises (adopted at the 
Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, promulgated by Order No. 39 of the Presi-
dent of the People's Republic of China, and effective on Apr. 12, 1986), English translation in 2 
LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHIN.~ (198:3-1986) 254 (1987) [hereinafter LAWS 1983-1986]. 
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foreign investors to own one hundred percent of a business within 
China's borders and a law authorizing Chinese-foreign contractual joint 
ventures. •G 
Economic reforms have not been restricted to the arena of foreign 
business. They also have changed' the way Chinese do business on the 
domestic front and the relationship between the state and the people. 
As a generalization, the Deng Administration has sought to retract the 
state's role. as paternalistic provider of all the people's needs while 
shifting responsibility· and granting material incentives to individuals. 
For example, Mao Zedong's "iron rice bowl" system, which guaranteed 
lifetime employment to every individual regardless of performance, re-
sulted in bloated and notoriously inefficient and unproductive state en-
terprises.46 Few real options existed because the state made all 
education and job assignments and kept labor mobility minimal. Start-
ing one's own business was "bourgeois" and out of the question!7 
In 1986 new regulations instituted a "labor contract"48 system 
whereby newly hired employees in state enterprises enjoy job security 
only for the contractual term of employment. Employees have new free-
dom to seek more remunerative work, for example, in foreign joint ven-
tures, at the end of the contract term. Additional regulations were 
designed to tighten discipline in state enterprises!9 Moreover, the gov-
ernment now officially encourages individuals and groups to start their 
own businesses in the cities and rural townships. Private farmers' mar-
kets are flourishing, and a whole new set of societal norms have been 
introduced which place value on individual entrepreneurship.Go By 1987 
private businesses were sanctioned specifically,G1 and provisional regula-
tions on private enterprises went into effect in 1988.G2 In 1989 bold pro-
45. Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures 
(adopted at the First Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on Apr. 13, 1980), English 
translation in BEIJING REv., June 20-26, 1988, at 29. 
46. See J. PRYBYLA, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: PROBLEMS & POLICIES 132, 173 (2d ed. 1981). 
47. Mao's emphasis upon collective economic activities allowed little room for individual en-
terprise, however small. Peasant households sometimes were allowed to engage in sideline activities 
like chicken raising and handicrafts, and the cultivation of small private farm plots, but even these 
were considered the "tails of capitalism" to be "cut off" during the Cultural Revolution. L. PAN, 
THE NEW CHINESE REVOLUTION 22 (1987). 
48. Interim Regulations on Labor Contracts in State-Owned Enterprises, July 12, 1986, pub-
lished in Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), Sept. 10, 1986, at 2, col. l. 
49. Provisional Regulations of the State Council Governing the Dismissal of Undisciplined 
Staff Members and Workers by State-Owned Enterprises, July 12, 1986, published in Renmin 
Ribao (People's Daily), Sept. 10, 1986, at 2, col. l. 
50. See generally 0. SCHELL, To GET RICH Is GLORIOUS: CHINA IN THE EIGHTIES (1984). 
51. Regulation Issued to Supervise Priuate Businesses, China Daily, Aug. 19, 1987, at 1, col. 
l. 
52. Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China Concerning Private Enter-
prises (promulgated by the State Council on June 25, 1988, and effective on July I, 1988), English 
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posals to end state ownership were being debated openly by leading 
Chinese economists.113 
The Chinese economic system appears to have been undergoing a 
fundamental restructuring, adopting many features of a private sector, 
free market economy. The favorable developments on China's economic 
front have been accompanied by legal reforms aimed at improving 
human rights protections. In part because of the new importance of its 
place on the world stage, China formally has recognized certain basic 
freedoms of Chinese citizens. 
The 1982 Constitution contains a number of significant promises. 
Chapter II is devoted to fundamental rights and duties of citizens and 
includes guarantees of freedoms of religious belief,114 speech, press, as-
sembly, association, procession, and demonstration. 1111 The Constitution 
also declares that the "[f]reedom of the person of citizens of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China is inviolable," and provides safeguards for 
proper arrests and prohibitions against unlawful detentions or searches 
of persons118 and searches of residences.117 The Constitution guarantees 
freedom and privacy of correspondence,118 and the right of citizens to 
criticize and make suggestions regarding any state organ or 
functionary. 1111 
Many of China's contemporary leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, 
personally endured great hardship and suffering during the Cultural 
Revolution; the Constitution reflects a commitment to avoid such harsh 
abuses of power that were perpetrated by the leadership on the Chinese 
people in the past.80 Under its present leadership modern China already 
had remedied many of the more serious abuses of its recent past by the 
time the controversial-congressional resolution on the "Tibet Question" 
was promulgated in 1987.81 
The Chinese are extremely sensitive about the world's perception 
translation in East Asian Exec. Rep., Oct. 15, 1988, at 24. 
53. Kristof, In Beijing, a Bold New Proposal: End State Ownership of Industry, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 10, 1989, at A1, col. 4. 
54. 1982 CONST., supra note 14, arts. 34, 36, English translation in 1 LAws 1979-1982, supra 
note 14, at 12. 
55. ld. art. 35, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 12. 
56. ld. art. 37, English translation in 1 LAws 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 12. 
57. ld. art. 39, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 13. 
58. ld. art. 4o, English translation in 1 LAws 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 13. 
59. ld. art. 41, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 13. 
60. For example, article 38 states that "[t]he personal dignity of citizens of the People's Re-
public of China is inviolable. Insult, libel, false accusation or false incrimination directed against 
citizens by any means is prohibited." ld. art. 38, English translation in 1 LAws 1979-1982, supra 
note 14, at 12-13. The language of this article addresses precisely the kind of abuses fostered by 
the Red Guards during the decade prior to Mao's death. 
61. See supra note 6. 
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of their actions in Tibet. As a minority population in the Tibet Autono-
mous Region, the backward Tibetans obviously are helpless in the 
hands of the well-armed Chinese. The Deng regime has recognized the 
important role of national ethnic minorities in China's unification 
movement. The preamble to the 1982 Constitution states that "China is 
a unitary multi-national state created jointly by the people of all its 
nationalities."62 Equal treatment of all nationalities is guaranteed, and 
the state is pledged to assist minority nationality areas in their eco-
nomic and cultural development.63 Discrimination against or oppression 
of any nationality is prohibited expressly.64 Placed in the context of 
China's move to unify traditionally Chinese areas, its treatment of mi-
norities assumes particular importance. Taiwan is considered part of 
the "sacred territory" of China, and the Constitution states that it is 
the inviolable dut)l of all Chinese people to accomplish the task of re-
unifying Taiwan with the Chinese motherland.60 
These developments are not only advantageous to the United 
States from an economic perspective but also hold great potential for 
strategic advantage. Particularly after the ignominious withdrawal of 
United States forces from Vietnam, the Pacific Ocean no longer can be 
claimed as the "American Sea." The Soviet Union gained its only warm 
water port to the Pacific through a 1978 defense pact with Vietnam, 
which gave it access to Cam Ranh Bay, and has proceeded to expand its 
Pacific presence.68 With American influence in the region under chal-
lenge from many directions, the continuing risks of losing Clark Air 
Force Base and Subic Naval Base in the Philippines pose major strate-
gic challenges for the· United States presence in the eastern Pacific re-
gion. A friendly and supportive relationship with China, which borders 
Russia along thousands of miles of common frontier, obviously augers 
well for the United States. 
However, the warming of the United States-China relationship over 
the past decade has not occurred without legal, economic, and political 
problems. In spite of its ambitious drive to develop a modern, more 
Western legal system that will provide a receptive and secure environ-
ment for Western investment, the bureaucratic inertia of the Chinese 
system has created many problems for Western investors and potential 
trading partners. The Western business press has appeared preoccupied 
during recent years with the problems of United States investments in 
62. 1982 CoNST., supra note 14, preamble, English translation in 1 LAws 1979-1982, supra 
note 14, at 4. 
63. /d. art. 4, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-19~2. supra note 14, at 6. 
64. /d. 
65. /d. preamble, English translation in 1 LAws 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 4. 
66. The Russians Are Landing, EcoNOMIST, Apr. 28, 1984, at 57. 
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China.87 Trade between the two nations, while growing, also has been 
attended by other nagging problems such as protectionist concerns in 
the United States over cheap textile imports from China, United States 
barriers to the export of high technology to China, and concerns over 
the use of Chinese-built Silkworm missiles by Iran in the Persian 
Gulf.68 
Individually and cumulatively, these problems should not threaten 
the fundamental viability of the United States-China relationship. 
While such problems arise primarily from commercial practices and can 
be solved with commercial solutions, the "Tibet Question" raised by 
Congress is potentially more serious because it raises political issues 
that cut to the very heart of deeply held convictions of both the Chi-
nese and the Americans. It also illustrates the indissoluble linkage be-
tween presidential foreign relations powers and congressional foreign 
relations powers, and provides a contemporary case study of the frus-
tration of United States interests when those powers are not exercised 
in concert. 
V. THE CoNGRESSIONAL AcTION ON THE "TIBET QuESTION" AND ITs 
EFFECT ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 
In spite of its historical obscurity, Tibet has been the subject of 
much recent political notoriety, highlighted by violent anti-Chinese 
demonstrations in its capital city, Lhasa, beginning in the fall of 1987. 
Concern in the American Congress about the human rights situation in 
Tibet had been building for months before the demonstrations began. 
From the Chinese perspective, a combination of congressional meddling 
in China's domestic affairs and anti-Chinese propaganda by the Dalai 
Lama precipitated the violence in Lhasa. On June 18, 1987, the United 
States House of Representatives debated amendments to the appropri-
ations bill, House Bill 1777, for the fiscal years 1988 and 1989.69 The 
amendment, introduced by Congressman Daniel Mica, charged the Chi-
nese with continued human rights abuses in Tibet, commended the Da-
lai Lama for his efforts to secure peace and religious freedom in Tibet, 
and reiterated the 1985 request made to China by ninety-one members 
67. See, e.g., China's Economic Reforms Don't Impress Foreigners, Asian Wall St. J., July 
27, 1987, at 3, col. 1. 
68. The possible Chinese military application of Western technology continues to concern 
United States policy makers. Although the proepects for increased military exchanges between the 
two countries have been explored, recent incidents such as use of China's Silkworm missile by Iran 
have exacerbated sore points in the United States-China relationship. Related concerns surfaced 
again in spring 1989 when it was disclosed that Iran was building a missile plant and continuing to 
develop its chemical warfare capability with China's assistance. See China Helping Iran to Build 
Missile Factory, Asian Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1989, at 3, col. 3. 
69. See 133 CoNe. REc. H5217-30 (daily ed. June 18, 1987). 
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of Congress that China conduct direct talks with the Dalai Lama and 
the Tibetans in exile.70 This amendment was passed with the compan-
ion House amendment that condemned China generally for its failure 
to grant adequate religious freedoms.71 The support in Congress that 
led to passage of the amendments was generated in part through the 
lobbying efforts of Tibetan centers in the United States.72 
The House action stung the tourist-hungry Chinese who need the 
continuing influx of foreign currency into Tibet and China to fuel 
China's aggressive program of modernization. Chinese resentment of 
the congressional action was widespread among the general populace73 
as well as among official government and Party spokespersons.74 Con-
gressman Mica's amendment to House Bill 1777 called upon the Presi-
dent of the United States to instruct United States officials, including 
ambassadors to China and India, "to pay greater attention to the con-
cerns of the Tibetan people and to work closely with all concerned 
about human rights violations in Tibet."7~ The stage was set for conflict 
between the political aspirations of Congress and the executive branch 
policies pursued for more than fifteen years to develop a rapprochement 
with China. 
On September 21, 1987, the Dalai Lama made an unprecedented 
appearance before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus and 
presented a five point plan designed to transform Tibet into a "zone of 
peace and non-violence."76 The plan was presented to the House of 
Representatives and read into the record by Congressman Tom Lantos 
70. Ninety-one members of Congress signed a letter to China's President Li Xiannian on 
July 24, 1988, which contained the request. /d. at H5219. 
71. /d. at H5231. 
72. Tiny Group of Tibetans Raises Loud Voice of Conscience, INSIGHT, Apr. 25, 1988, at 18. 
The "Office of Tibet," the unofficial consulate of the Dalai Lama's government-in-exile, is a 
"grapevine federation" of 15 regional offices throughout the United States devoted to calling atten-
tion to the political aims of Tibet's exile community. Although there were only about 500 Tibetans 
in the United States by 1988, there are 250 Tibetan centers nationwide, most of them built since 
1970 to accommodate growing interest in Tibetan culture, specifically in Tibetan Buddhism. /d. 
73. The Author was in China when the controversial amendment was addressed by the 
House of Representatives, and bases his conclusions on Chinese reactions in the Chinese press as 
well as numerous interviews with Chinese students, intellectuals, and others. 
74. Officially recognized "Tibetan leaders," who generally are viewed as subservient to the 
Chinese power structure, also joined the chorus against the United States Congress and the Dalai 
Lama. See, e.g., Panchen Lama on "Tibetan Independence," CHINA RECONSTRUCTS, Jan. 1988, at 
8; Tibetan Leaders on the Tibet Situation, BEIJING REv., Apr. 18-24, 1988, at 18. 
75. 133 CoNG. REc. H5219 (daily ed. June 18, 1987). 
76. See Roy, supra note 7, at 50. Before his September 1987 visit to the United States, the 
Dalai Lama had visited the United States on three previous occasions during which he had not 
engaged in any activities oth~r than those expected from his status as a respected religious leader. 
The United States visa for his September 1987 visit was granted to him only in his capacity as a 
religious leader, ostensibly to enable him to consecrate a Buddhist shrine at the University of 
Indiana. /d. 
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on the next day as a "political statement" by the Dalai Lama as "politi-
cal leader of the Tibetan people" from his government-in-exile.77 The 
Dalai Lama's peace plan contained the following five basic components: 
(1) transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace; (2) aban-
donment of China's population transfer policy; (3) respect for the Ti-
betan people's fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms; 
(4) restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment and the 
abandonment of China's use of Tibet for the production of nuclear 
weapons and dumping of nuclear waste; and (5) commencement of ear-
nest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of relations between 
the Tibetan and Chinese peoples.78 
The United States House of Representatives also passed a resolu-
tion in which the Senate concurred on September 22, 1987, welcoming 
the Dalai Lama on the occasion of his visit to the United States, and 
commending him "for furthering the just and honorable causes that he 
has championed."79 His principal cause, of course, always had been to 
have the Chinese totally removed or withdrawn from Tibet. 
As a prelude to the Dalai Lama's appearance, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Subcommittee on Human Rights had heard testimony on the 
Tibetan situation on September 17, 1987.80 Appearing before the Sub-
committee were Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Stapleton Roy, the 
executive director of Amnesty International, and four other experts on 
the Tibetan situation. Based on that testimony, Senator Claiborne Pell 
reported to the Senate that the human rights situation had improved 
along with the economy under the administration of Deng Xiaoping. 
Nevertheless, it was noted that some human rights abuses were contin-
uing, specifically in the detention and abuse of political prisoners in 
Tibet. 81 
The new trends in Chinese policy towards Tibet were documented 
in a special report on the treatment of minorities in China prepared by 
the Department of State at the request of the Subcommittee on Human 
Rights and submitted to the Subcommittee on October 1, 1987.82 The 
report concluded that important aspects of Chinese policy toward Tibet 
improved after 1980, but that problems remain and the current situa-
tion is not as favorable as the Chinese would have Americans believe. 83 
77. Proposal for Peace and Accommodation in Tibet-Statement of the Dalai Lama, 133 
CoNG. REc. E3641 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1987). 
78. /d. at E3642. 
79. H.R. Con. Res. 191, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CoNG. REc. H7745 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 
1987). 
80. See 133 CoNG. REc. 812,496 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Claiborne Pell). 
81. See id. 
82. Roy, supra note 7, at 51. 
83. /d. 
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In his statement, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Roy observed 
that the Dalai Lama was granted a United States visa for his current 
visit solely in his capacity as a religious leader, "since the United States 
Government considers Tibet to be a part of China and does not in any 
way recognize the Tibetan government in exile that the Dalai Lama 
claims to head."84 The Chinese Minister of Justice issued a protest 
against the Dalai Lama's remarks and those of "some United States 
Congressmen" who had spoken on the issue, characterizing their state-
ments as "sinister slander."81 
On September 27, 1987, within days of the Dalai Lama's appear-
ance before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, a separatist dem-
onstration was held at Tibetan Buddhism's most holy site, the Jokhang 
Temple in Lhasa. Tibetan Buddhist monks impatient for the return of 
the Dalai Lama and restive under Chinese domination led the move-
ment.88 On September 30 Congressman Lantos reported to the press 
information he had received that the Chinese government had executed 
at least two Tibetan nationalists as a political message in reprisal for 
the speeches given by the Dalai Lama during his visit to the United 
States.87 Congressman Lantos attributed the report "to a translation of 
Radio Lhasa made by Tibetan exiles in India, who monitor the state-
controlled radio broadcasts." Representatives of the Dalai Lama in New 
York provided the transcript to Lantos. The Chinese Embassy in Wash-
ington denied the allegations. 88 
October 7, 1987, marked the thirty-seventh anniversary ofthe Chi-
nese Army's invasion of Tibet, but the attitude of Tibetans was not 
celebratory. On October 1 violence had erupted in Lhasa, leaving at 
least six persons dead, many arrested, and considerable property dam-
aged.89 According to Chinese sources, about fifty foreign tourists and 
nationals were seen among the rioters.90 Two Americans who were pre-
sent in Lhasa during the riots were ordered out of Tibet.81 The Chinese 
response was swift and certain. Beijing issued one of its harshest at-
84. U.S. Can Not Support Dalai Lama Programme, China Daily, Oct. 17, 19S7, at 1, col. 7. 
Roy further stated the Administration's position that when the Dalai Lama "assumes a political 
status and advances a political programme for Tibet, which we consider to be part of China, the 
United States Government cannot support him." /d. 
S5. Accusations by Dalai Lama False, China Daily, Oct. 1, 19S7, at 1, col. 3. 
S6. Chinese Report Protest by Lamas to Free Tibet; N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 19S7, at AS, col. 3. 
S7. Executions Are Claimed, N.Y. Times, Oct. i, 19S7, at AS, col. 4. 
88. /d. 
S9. See Tibetan Protest for Independence Becomes Violent, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 19S7, at A1, 
col. 6. 
90. Foreigners Found in Lhasa Violence, China Daily, Oct. 12, 19S7, at 3, col. 1. 
91. 2 American Mountaineers Tell of Witnessing Tibet Protests, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 19S7, 
at A6, col. 1. 
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tacks on the Dalai Lama, whom it blamed for inciting the riot,92 and 
immediately dispatched additional security forces to Lhasa.93 Tele-
phone and telex communications were interrupted within days of the 
October riots, and Tibet virtually was sealed off from the outside 
world.94 A curfew was imposed,9~ foreign journalists were barred from 
reporting in Lhasa96 after additional demonstrations occurred on the 
sixth of October,97 and Western reporters subsequently were expelled.98 
On October 7 the Dalai Lama held a press conference at his headquar-
ters near Dharamasala, India, and urged his supporters to continue pro-
testing Chinese rule but to do so peacefully.99 Chinese criticism, 
provoked by the Dalai Lama's press conference, resulted in a reaffirma-
tion by Indian government spokesmen that Tibet is considered part of 
China and that the Dalai Lama should limit his activities to nonpoliti-
cal matters.100 By mid-October the Chinese government imposed a tem-
porary ban on all foreign visitors to TibeP01 and set deadlines for the 
surrender of separatist protesters. 
Congress and the executive branch were divided sharply in their 
reactions to the Chinese crackdown. On October 6, 1987, the Reagan 
Administration voiced support for China's position in controlling the 
unrest in Lhasa. 102 On the same day the United States Senate voted 
unanimously to condemn China for its response to the demonstrations 
and urged the President to meet with the Dalai Lama. The resolution 
also threatened to link future American arms sales to China to improve-
ment in China's human rights record. 103 This movement in the Senate 
was led by a coalition of Democrats who promoted human rights and 
\!2. China Blames Tibetan Leader for Violent Protest, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 19S7, § 1, at 16, 
col. 1. 
93. Chinese Police Take Over Section of Holiest Buddhist Site in Tibet, N.Y. Times, Oct. 
6, 19S7, at Al. col. 1; Chinese Move to Quell Tibet Demonstrations, Asian Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 19S7, 
at 1, col. 3. 
94. Communications to Tibet Curbed and Foreigners Are Banned, N.Y. Times, Oct. S, 
19S7, at AS, col. 5. 
95. Chinese Curfew in the Tibet Capital, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 19S7, at A6, col. 1. 
96. Beijing Barring Journalists from Reporting in Lhasa, Asian Wall St. J., Oct. 9-10, 19S7, 
at S, col. 1. 
97. On October 6, 19S7, about 60 people were arrested in Lhasa when they marched on 
government offices. 60 Shout Out Dalai Lama's Name and Are Seized in Protest in Tibet, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 7, 19S7, at AS, col. 1. 
9S. China Expels Western Reporters in Tibet, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 19S7, at A3, col. 4. 
99. Dalai Lama Urges Peaceful Protest Against China, N.Y. Times, Oct. S, 19S7, at AS, col. 
3. 
100. In Tibet's Dark Hour, Dalai Lama Is Their Refuge, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 19SS, at A4, col. 
3. 
101. Government Restricts Tibet Visits, China Daily, Oct. 15, 19S7, at 1, col. 1. 
102. Beijing Is Bat.~ed by Administration on Unrest in Tibet, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 19S7, at 
Al, col. 3. 
103. /d. 
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Republican conservatives who supported Taiwan. 1~ Congressman 
Lantos advanced a plan that would give the Dalai Lama's government-
in-exile observer status at the United Nations, similar to the status en-
joyed by the Palestine Liberation Organization.1011 On the day of the 
Senate condemnation of China, protests were renewed in Lhasa, and 
sixty people who marched to a government office in the capital city 
were arrested. 108 
State Department officials assailed the Senate action and predicted 
that it was almost certain to damage United States-China ties.107 The 
State Department reaffirmed the position that Tibet is a part of China 
and that the Dalai Lama is a religious leader only, not the head of a 
Tibetan government-in-exile.108 This position of moderation subjected 
the State Department to immediate and continuing criticism by the 
press. 109 In response to sharp criticism from Congress, Stapleton Roy 
defended the Administration's position before a joint hearing of two 
subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 14, 
1987. He cautioned that a distinction should be made between expres-
sion of concern over human rights and interference in Chinese domestic 
affairs.110 Roy explained that the Administration agreed with the Dalai 
Lama with respect to the need for preservation of fundamental human 
rights in Tibet, and for freedom of Tibetan people to develop and to 
exercise basic democratic freedoms, but could not support him "when 
he assumes a political status and advances a political program for Ti-
bet, which we consider to be part of China. "111 
104. Fire at the Top of the World, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 19, 1987, at 50. 
105. U.S. Official Defends Stance on Turmoil in Tibet, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1987, at A18, 
col. 1. 
106. 60 Shout Out Dalai Lama's Name and Are Seized in Protest in Tibet, supra note 97. 
The Chinese code of criminal procedure specifically prohibits the use of torture. See Criminal 
Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 32 (adopted at the Second Session of the 
Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 1979, promulgated by Order No.6 of the Chairman of 
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on July 7, 1979, and effective as of Jan. 
1, 1980), English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 120, 126. However, the United 
States State Department has reported that public security personnel sometimes use harsh treat-
ment at the time of detention of suspects, and that a number of reliable sources reported that 
People's Armed Police severely beat several monks who were detained during the demonstrations 
in Lhasa on October 6, 1987. See CouNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987: RE-
PORT SuBMITTED TO THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE SENATE COMM. ON FoREIGN 
RELATIONS BY THE DEP'T OF STATE, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 662 (Joint Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter 
1987 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT). 
107. Beijing Is Backed by Administration on Unrest in Tibet, supra note 102. 
108. ld. The United States has recognized the sovereignty of China over Tibet since the 
1940s; since 1978, the United States has recognized Tibet only as part of China. /d. at A9, col. 1. 
109. See, e.g., Rosenthal, Selling Out Tibet, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1988, at A31, col. 6; Stand 
Up for Decency in Tibet, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1987, at A38, col. 1. 
110. U.S. Official Defends Stance on Turmoil in Tibet, supra note 105. 
111. Roy, supra note 7, at 51. 
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Unsettled by the congressional offensive in setting United States 
foreign policy, senior State Department officials engaged in serious dis-
cussions during mid-October to reassess the Department's position on 
Tibet. The principal objective seemed to be the identification of more 
effective ways for the Department to express displeasure over alleged 
human rights abuses in ways that would not offend China unnecessarily 
and that would assure it that the United States has no intention of 
upsetting China's security arrangements on its border.112 
Chinese sources promptly denounced the Senate action and ex-
pressed "strong indignation."113 On October 16, 1987, Deng Xiaoping 
verbally lashed out at several members of Congress for their continued 
provocative statements on Tibet and for the recent disturbances there. 
Although he affirmed that the Tibetan situation would not affect the 
"overall good situation" between the United States and China, he did 
express concern over the "ignorance and arrogance" of the members of 
Congress concerned.114 On the same day the Chinese government de-
nied permission to a delegation of members of Congress headed by Rep-
resentative Lantos to visit Tibet.m By early 1988 an uneasy peace had 
been restored to Lhasa, but it remained clouded by serious unresolved 
questions about Tibet's past, present, and future. 116 
By late 1987 the highly publicized debate over the "Tibet Ques-
tion" ensured that any position taken on amending House Bill 1777117 
would be interpreted as either favoring or opposing human rights. Amid 
such controversy it virtually was a foregone conclusion that Congress's 
condemnation of China would become part of the national laws. On De-
cember 22, 1987, Congress passed the Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act for fiscal years 1988 and 1989.118 Section 1243 condemned China for 
alleged violations of human rights in Tibet and announced a congres-
sional policy that "the United States should make the treatment of the 
Tibetan people an important factor in its conduct of relations with the 
People's Republic of China."119 Similar condemnations were made in 
section 1245 for other alleged abuses in China. 120 One interpretation of 
112. U.S. Is Reassessing Response on Tibet, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1987, § 1, at 17, col. 1. 
113. See U.S. Amendment on Tibet "a Farce," China Daily, Oct. 17, 1987, at 4, col. 3. 
114. Chinese Leader Faults U.S. Lawmakers on Tibet, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1987, at 32, col. 
1. 
115. ld. 
116. Chinese Established a Truce, Though Shaky, in Tibet, St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 5, 
1988, at A16, col. 1. 
117. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
118. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-204, 
100 Stat. 1331 (codified in.part in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.). 
119. ld. § 1243(b)(2), 100 Stat. at 1423. 
120. ld. § 1245, 100 Stat. at 1425-26. 
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this series of events, clearly implied by congressional treatment of the 
Dalai Lama, is that Congress regarded Tibet as a sovereign nation enti-
tled to independence from China, with the Dalai Lama as the political 
head of that nation. 
Other events strained United States-China relations in 1988. In 
January it was disclosed that Defense Department officials soon would 
add China to a public list of nations designated as hostile to the United 
States. The list applies only to the Defense Department and is pub-
lished under a Pentagon regulation that forbids the issuance of security 
Clearances to naturalized citizens from "hostile" nations until they have 
been American citizens for five years.121 The decision to add China to 
the list was made after a review following the Reagan Administration's 
concerns over the use of Chinese-made Silkworm missiles by Iran in the 
Persian Gulf. 122 
By mid-February 1988 a Chinese official described United States-
China relations as "potentially unstable," and attacked what he charac-
terized as interference in China's internal affairs. Congressional criti-
cism of China's handling of the Tibet situation and congressional 
allegations of human rights abuses in China were among the principal 
problems cited in the climate of worsening relations. 123 By early March 
of 1988, however, the Reagan Administration was reported to have been 
considering relaxation of restrictions on high technology exports to 
China because it had been determined that China no longer sold Silk-
worm missiles to Iran. 124 
After the October 1987 turmoil in Lhasa had subsided, Chinese au-
thorities began a series of initiatives to reduce tensions in Tibet. An 
exten&ive political indoctrination campaign was conducted in major 
Buddhist monasteries in an effort to persuade Tibetans of the futility 
and illegality of calling for independence. m Improvements in Tibetan 
living conditions under Chinese rule were highlighted both in such 
meetings and in the Chinese press. The Panchen Lama, who ranked 
second to the Dalai Lama as Tibet's spiritual leader, but lived in Beij-
ing and served in an official role recognized by the Chinese government, 
121. Secret Is Out on Listing China as Hostile Country, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1988, at A20, 
col. I. 
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visited Lhasa in January of 1988 in an effort to conciliate Tibetans. 
The Chinese displays of tolerance failed to control the tension, and 
the short-lived peace disintegrated. On March 5, 1988, Tibetan mobs 
again took to the streets in Lhasa, reportedly killing three Chinese po-
licemen; the police killed at least five Tibetans as rioting ravaged the 
city.126 The rioting came at the close of the week-long Great Prayer Fes-
tival, which had been opened to foreign journalists. Tibetans reportedly 
were concerned that the Chinese used the festival as a showcase for 
foreigners to display the relative calm that existed in Lhasa. 127 
The rioting could not have been timed better to embarrass Chinese 
officials and to place additional strains on the United States-China rela-
tionship. The riots broke out on the eve of the arrival of the Chinese 
foreign minister, Wu Xueqian, in Washington for meetings with Ameri-
can officials to discuss problems that recently had surfaced in United 
States-China relations, including the congressional allegations of human 
rights abuses in Tibet.128 Many officials in China blamed the resurgence 
of riots on too much Chinese leniency, and hardliners briefly appeared 
to be in the ascendancy. In response to the March rioting, the Panchen 
Lama called for heavy punishment of the rioters and warned Tibetans 
that they should not misinterpret Chinese "leniency and forbearance as 
signs of weakness."1211 Strict limits on tourism to Tibet continued to be 
imposed after the renewed rioting in March 1988.130 
In early April, however, China again reverted to a conciliatory ap-
proach by inviting the Dalai Lama to return to live in Tibet if he would 
cease to call for Tibetan independence.131 In contrast to previous Chi-
nese offers to give him a post in Beijing, this offer was the first time he 
had been invited to live in Tibet. 132 Although the Dalai Lama rejected 
the offer, he also appeared more conciliatory in his response.133 TheDa-
lai Lama's position generally has been one of strong opposition to the 
Chinese military presence in Tibet with little or no acknowledgement of 
any legitimate Chinese interests in Tibet. He also has denied China's 
right to handle Tibet's foreign affairs. In a dramatic shift, he reversed 
both positions in a speech to a meeting of members of the European 
126. Id. Unconfirmed and anonymous reports made to the New York Times by a foreigner 
claimed that 18 monks died in the March rioting. New Report Says 18 Monks Died in Tibet 
Protest, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1988, § 1, at 6, col. l. 
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128. See id. 
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132. Id. 
133. Id. 
22 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
Parliament in Strasbourg, France, on June 15, 1988.134 He recognized 
China's right to handle Tibet's foreign affairs and at least temporarily 
to maintain troops on Chinese soil until talks with China could be con-
summated to make Tibet "a self-governing democratic political entity" 
associated with China.1311 
By early 1989 events again soured the prospects for a meaningful 
dialogue between the Dalai Lama and Beijing. In January the Panchen 
Lama died. Although he was regarded as Beijing's lackey, the Panchen 
Lama decried China's abuses in his Tibetan homeland before his 
death. 138 On March 5, 1989, a small group of Buddhist monks and nuns 
marched near the Jokhang Temple in Lhasa, carrying proindependence 
signs. The protests quickly escalated into open clashes with the police, 
and riots lasted for several days.137 The outbursts left as many as thirty 
persons dead, and martial law was imposed by Chinese authorities. 138 
By March 10, 1989, the thirtieth anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan upris-
ing against Chinese domination, Tibet's capital city was marked by rel-
ative calm only because of a military clampdown. 139 
Congress has a legitimate concern over the human rights records of 
other countries, particularly those with whom the United States has ec-
onomic and other special relationships. Congress premised its involve-
ment in the above scenario on its concern with China's human rights 
record generally and specifically with respect to Tibet. Those original 
concerns of the House of Representatives140 may be categorized into six 
different areas: (1) Chinese dominion over Tibet; (2) the abuses perpe-
trated upon Tibet and Tibetans during the Cultural Revolution; 
(3) poor living conditions in Tibet; (4) the influx of Chinese into Tibet; 
(5) reports by Amnesty International of current human rights abuses of 
Tibetans for the nonviolent expression of religious and political beliefs; 
and (6) the failure of the Deng government to respond to the 1985 let-
ter signed by ninety-one members of Congress calling for direct talks 
between China and the Dalai Lama.141 To evaluate these concerns in 
the context of the above events, it is useful first to review the human 
rights situation in China and particularly China's position on issues of 
critical concern to the Tibetans, such as freedom of religion. A complete 
134. Dalai Lama Approves Chinese Role in Tibet, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1988, at A7, col. 1. 
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137. Chinese Declare Martial Law in Lhasa, Asian Wall St. J., Mar. 8, 1989, at 3, col. 4. 
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140. See 133 CoNG. REc. H5219 (daily ed. June 18, 1987) (setting forth congressional findings 
on human rights violations in Tibet by the People's Republic of China). 
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analysis of the subject of human rights in China is beyond the scope of 
this Article, but the following highlights describe the situation that pre-
vailed in China, including Tibet, when the controversial amendments to 
House Bill 1777 were introduced and debated. 
VI. THE CHINESE RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
When the United States formally recognized China in 1979 and en-
ded the decades of United States-China estrangement, China was ruled 
by an authoritarian government dominated by a privileged elite that 
exercised control through a one party system. That situation has not 
changed to this day. China continues to be ruled by a small group of 
leaders who dominate several key organizations, including the Politburo 
and its five-member standing committee, the Military Commission, and 
the Secretariat. All share power within the overall dominance of the 
Chinese Communist Party. Deng Xiaoping, who serves as Chairman of 
the Party's key Central Military Commission, clearly continues to be 
China's preeminent leader.142 Freedoms of speech, press, religion, and 
other basic human rights continue to be circumscribed, although liber-
alizations have occurred in recent years.148 
Congressional concern over the Cultural Revolution as expressed in 
the amendments to House Bill 1777 certainly was valid. The Tibet Au-
tonomous Region was hit particularly hard by the Cultural Revolution. 
Mao's "Red Guards" flooded into Lhasa in 1966, and many young 
Tibetans joined them, engaging in virtually unrestrained destruction of 
Tibetan history. Religious scriptures and texts were burned, and 
thousands of monasteries and other historical buildings that had wit-
nessed centuries of Tibetan history were destroyed. The people were 
subjugated totally, their religious and social customs banned, and even 
the traditional crops of barley were changed by government decree. 
Many Tibetans were subjected to public humiliation and abuse. There 
is no accurate measure available for the number of lives lost. The con-
gressional amendment stated that "over one million Tibetans have per-
ished since 1949 as a direct result of political instability, imprisonment, 
and widescale famine."144 No source for this data was indicated, nor was 
a more specific time period designated, but it is fair to assume that this 
estimate focused primarily on the period of the Cultural Revolution. 
The Tibetans did not suffer alone. The Han Chinese, the dominant 
ruling group in China, likewise suffered throughout the nation from the 
virtually unrestrained rampages of Mao's "Red Guards" during the Cul-
142. 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 106, at 660. 
143. /d. 
144. 133 CoNG. REc. H5219 (daily ed. June 18, 1987). 
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tural Revolution. Many of the abuses of human rights during the Cul-
tural Revolution have been chronicled by Amnesty InternationaP411 and 
others.148 An initial and basic tenet announced by the post-Mao regime 
in China was that those abuses should never be allowed to happen 
again. One of the first reforms of the Deng government took the un-
precedented step of publicly recognizing and condemning those abuses 
of the past. 147 The United States State Department issued a public 
statement commending China's new government for this forthright ac-
tion, 148 and Congress was informed of the new government's position in 
public hearings.••• Members of the notorious "Gang of Four," consid-
ered responsible for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, were ar-
rested, tried, and punished severely.1110 
Deng stated early in his regime that "to practise people's democ-
racy to the full" was one of three major objectives of China's moderni-
zation. 1111 No one, especially the Chinese, would suggest that they aspire 
to the same level of democracy that is practiced in the United States. 
Moreover, it is clear that human rights do not enjoy the same protec-
tions in China as they do in the United States and most other Western 
democracies. However, the trend in China for more than a decade has 
been towards greater liberalization in political and religious freedoms, 
and increased governmental respect for human rights generally. 
One of the principal thrusts of the Deng government has been to 
establish the consistent rule of law and to reduce the arbitrary rule of 
men. This trend is directly contrary to the highly personalized rule of 
Mao Zedong. The importance of this change may be illustrated in the 
Deng regime's liberalization of religious freedoms, a subject of consider-
able relevance to the Tibetan Buddhists. 
In China, as in other Communist countries, religion is considered to 
be a potential competitor for the people's loyalty to the state. The ex-
treme leftism of the Cultural Revolution sought a final solution in the 
145. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT; AMNESTY INT'L, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT. 
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Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 43, 44 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Hearings) (statement of Charles W. 
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eradication of all religious practices. That effort was unsuccessful, and 
Deng Xiaoping's reformist government initiated a policy of limited reli-
gious toleration in 1978.102 The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) convened 
under Deng's leadership and became a watershed event in the economic 
opening of China. 103 The new Constitution of the People's Republic of 
China, adopted on March 5, 1978, by the Fifth National People's Con-
gress, contained the following provision on religion: "Citizens enjoy 
freedom to believe in religion and freedom not to believe in religion and 
to propagate atheism. "104 Although the new leadership did not abandon 
the ultimate goal of weakening religion's influence, it appeared to have 
reversed its position on abolishing religion, at least for the foreseeable 
future. 
The 1982 Constitution expanded the protections for freedom of re-
ligious belief: 
Article 34. 
All citizens of the People's Republic of China who have reached the age of 18 
have the right to vote and stand for election, regardless of ... religious belief ... , 
except persons deprived of political rights according to law.111 
Article 36. 
Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. 
No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to be-
lieve in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens 
who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. 
The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion 
to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or 
interfere with the educational system of the state. 
Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign 
domination.'" 
Following the official liberalization of religious freedoms under 
Deng, religion appears to have enjoyed a substantial resurgence 
152. 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 106, at 670. 
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throughout China and Tibet, particularly during the year preceding the 
United States congressional resolution of June 1987.137 The number of 
Chinese who practice religion reportedly has increased since 1978; offi-
cial estimates in 1987 placed the totals at three million Catholics, four 
million Protestants, fifteen m"illion Muslims, and more than ten million 
Buddhists. Daoists are estimated into millions at a minimum.138 Many 
of the religious institutions that had been closed during the Cultural 
Revolution have been reopened. In 1987 there were more than 30,000 
churches, temples-, monasteries, and mosques in service in China. Many 
of the Buddhists and Daoist temples have been reopened, often after 
restoration by the Chinese government.139 The restoration of Tibetan 
monasteries also is continuing, although only a fraction of the 2700 
monasteries open before the Chinese suppression of the 1959 Tibetan 
uprising have been reopened. In addition to the appropriation of funds 
for extensive renovations, the government provides other financial sup-
port for religious bodies, including tax exemptions and certain cash 
subsidies.160 
There continues to be a pressing shortage of priests, ministers, 
monks, imams, and other religious leaders because older leaders are dy-
ing and the government limits the number of new clergy.161 However,· 
the government has relaxed controls somewhat on access to the clergy. 
In 1981 rules were liberalized to permit the establishment of seminar-
ies.162 Individual temples and mosques may run their own training pro-
grams. Religious publications. are printed in all languages that have 
religious significance in China. 163 
When one's own religious beliefs begin to affect others, however, 
the state may intervene. Article 36 of the 1982 Constitution clearly for-
bids di~crimination based upon religious beliefs, or imposition of reli-
gious beliefs upon others. It has been reported that official government 
policy forbids religious proselytizing other than at places of worship or 
believers' homes and discourages conversion of those under eighteen 
years <>f age.18• 
The Chinese government has sought to attain a high degree of na-
tional organization and control over religious bodies and to isolate them 
157. See 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 106, at 671. 
158. /d. at 671-72. 
159. /d. at 671. 
160. /d. 
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from foreign influences. Every religious body must affiliate with one of 
the eight national organizations representing Christianity, Buddhism, 
Islam, and Daoism. The government required all Protestant denomina-
tions to merge in the 1950s, and the Chinese Catholic church was split 
forcibly from Rome. Today there are five Chinese Christian organiza-
tions; two are Protestant and three are Catholic. 14111 There is no question 
that these official religious organizations are subject to the leadership of 
the Chinese state and the Communist Party. 
One of the most sensitive areas of official concern is the potential 
for foreign domination or influence over China's religious groups. This 
concern is rooted deeply in the bitter history of China's earlier contacts 
with the West when the influence of foreign missionaries was viewed as 
an integral element in the Western domination and resulting national 
humiliation of China. Article 36 of the 1982 Constitution asserts the 
principle of independence clearly: "Religious bodies and religious affairs 
are not subject to any foreign domination. "188 Although the government 
prohibits foreign missionaries from practicing among Chinese citizens, 
it has allowed some foreign clergymen to enter for brief periods to serve 
the resident foreign community.187 The government carefully monitors 
and controls contacts between Chinese and foreign religious organiza-
tions, although it has encouraged Chinese religious leaders to partici-
pate in international exchange activities.188 In an effort to cultivate the 
goodwill of Islamic nations and to gain support in critical minority ar-
eas of China, the government resumed giving permission to Muslim citi-
zens to make the Hajj in 1979. From 1985 to 1988 over 2000 Chinese 
have made the trip to Mecca each year. Chinese religious organizations 
also may accept unconditional gifts from foreign religious 
organizations. 188 
Official Chinese concern in this regard traditionally has focused on 
the Vatican, in part because of its continued diplomatic ties with Tai-
wan. Loyalty to Rome simply will not be tolerated by the authorities.170 
More recently, however, concern has focused on Tibetan loyalty to the 
Dalai Lama, particularly because of the mixed political and religious 
aspirations of his government-in-exile. While the Tibetan reverence of 
the Dalai Lama as religious leader has been tolerated, the difficulty 
arises in drawing a line of demarcation between religious and political 
165. ld. at 670-71. 
166. 1982 CoNsT., supra note 14, art. 36, English translation in 1 LAws 1979-1982, supra 
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allegiance and activities. Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution promotes 
education to combat "feudal" ideas, 171 and the Chinese have identified 
pre-1950 Tibet under the Dalai Lama as a feudal society. 172 Article 15 
states that "[d]isturbance of the socioeconomic order or disruption of 
the state economic plan by any organization or individual is prohib-
ited."173 The Chinese Criminal Law174 contains a wide variety of provi-
sions that might reach not only such overt activity as participation in 
the Lhasa riots, but also covert, nonviolent subversion of Chinese poli-
cies. For example, the Criminal Law broadly reaches "crimes of coun-
terrevolution"176 and "crimes of endangering public security."178 
China's human rights record clearly improved after reestablish-
ment of relations with the United States. That pattern of improvement 
has continued in recent years, although recent developments, including 
those in Tibet, have served as a reminder that China continues to be an 
authoritarian society and that liberalization clearly has its limits. One 
of the glaring deficiencies in the congressional findings supporting the 
amendments to House Bill 1777 was the failure to acknowledge the spe-
cific advances China has made in human rights during the past decade 
and its ongoing efforts to implement additional political liberalizations. 
However, the Beijing Massacre and the subsequent repression of the 
Ticmanmen Square democracy movement of 1989 have rekindled the 
congressional concerns expressed two years earlier. 
There have been earlier popular demonstrations in China to pro-
mote freedom and democracy, but none has had such profound conse-
quences as the democracy movement of spring 1989. The first public 
manifestations of the movement appeared when student protesters as-
sembled in the historic Ticmanmen Square of Beijing to protest corrup-
tion in government and the Communist leadership's antidemocratic 
policies.177 The movement quickly gained broad-based grass roots sup-
171. 1982 CONST., supra note 14, art. 24, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra 
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port during the next seven weeks when it was joined by intellectuals, 
journalists, workers, union representatives, and common people.178 
Normally sensitive to any kind of open challenge, China's leaders 
were embarrassed particularly by the timing of these demonstrations. 
The Taiwan Finance Minister, Shirley Kuo, arrived in Beijing on May 
1, 1989, for a meeting of the Asian Development Bank (ADB).171 Al-
though she was to have no official contact with the Beijing Govern-
ment180 and limited her business to meetings with the ADB, the 
Chinese leadership clearly hoped to use the occasion of her visit to 
make a favorable impression on Taiwan. More importantly, Mikhail 
Gorbachev, General Secretary to the Soviet Union, arrived in Beijing on 
May 15, 1989, for the first official summit meeting between the two 
Communist superpowers in thirty years.181 
The Chinese security forces exercised restraint in dealing with the 
protesters until two weeks after Gorbachev's departure. Units of the 
Chinese 27th Army began to disperse forcefully demonstrators on June 
3, 1989, but met resistance. By the early morning hours of June 4 
soldiers were firing on unarmed civilian protesters in Tia.nanmen 
Square and the streets of Beijing. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, were 
killed and countless others were wounded. 181 The world was horrified by 
the regime's brutal repression of its own people, using tanks and auto-
matic assault rifles, apparently without discrimination, against unarmed 
people in the Square and in the streets.183 Although the conservative 
Premier Li Peng was the official spokesman for the Government, the 
real leader behind the repression clearly was Deng Xiaoping, 1114 the 
eighty-four year old patriarch who emerged as the de facto leader of 
China in 1978,186 and who holds no official position in government ex-
cept the powerful Chairmanship of the Military Commission.188 
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Early reports indicated that after the massacre there were open 
conflicts in Beijing and elsewhere in China between different military 
units of the Army,187 but the old guard conservatives clearly emerged in 
control and imposed martial law to maintain dominance by military 
units.188 World concern was heightened further as the postrepression 
actions ofthe Deng regime suggested that China was falling back into 
the chaos of the Cultural Revolution.189 Party Chairman Zhao Ziyang, 
former premier and a leader of China's reform movement, abruptly dis-
appeared from public view and later was stripped of his official 
position.190 
The Chinese Government boldly denied the essential facts of the 
confrontation, despite the fact that they had been recorded and publi-
cized in graphic detail by the world's news media.191 The Chinese Gov-
ernment denounced its critics, and rejoined that no one had died in 
TiCUlanmen Square on the fourth of June, and that when the Army 
cleared the Square, student protesters left peacefully, with banners fly-
ing. According to this official version, any trouble that had occurred was 
caused elsewhere in Beijing by a counterrevolutionary rebellion of thugs 
who were attempting to overthrow the Communist state.192 The United 
States news media was accused of spreading falsehoods and 
rumormongering.193 Premier Li Peng stated further that the incident 
was "a good thing" because it gave the Party "another severe test."194 
Amid fears of widespread purge, Chinese security forces arrested hun-
dreds and systematically executed many who were involved in the 
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191. See, e.g., Dealing Death with a Big Lie, NEWSWEEK, June 26, 1989, at 26; see also 
Deng's Big Lie, TiME, June 26, 1989, at 6. 
192. See Dealing Death with a Big Lie, supra note 191, at 26. 
193. U.S. News Media in China's Riot, China Daily, July 13, 1989, at 4, col. 2. 
194. Top Leaders Tell Envoys Be Vigilant, Work Hard, China Daily, July 13, 1989, at 1, col. 
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demonstrations. 196 
The brutality of the crackdown sent shock waves throughout those 
areas China considered its traditional lands and which it currently is 
trying to bring back under its control. Most immediately threatened 
was Hong Kong, the economically powerful British enclave destined to 
return to Chinese control in 19971118 under the Chinese promise that its 
capitalist system will remain undisturbed for fifty years. 1111 Although its 
response was measured, Taiwan also was gravely concerned by a re-
newed fear of threat from Beijing.1118 
Beijing's crushing of the democracy movement was a serious set-
back for the cordial relations that had developed between China and 
the Western democracies during China's reform era.1811 Many Western 
businessmen who had invested heavily in China during the heady era of 
economic reforms scrambled to get out.200 President Bush, responding 
in measured terms, 201 immediately ordered a suspension of American 
military sales to China.202 At the subsequent economic summit in Paris, 
representatives of the United States and six other major Western pow-
195. Chinese Execute 24 More People, Including 7 from Beijing Protests, N.Y. Times, June 
23, 1989, at A1, col. 4; Chinese Arrest 400 in Beijing Amid Fears of a Wide Purge; Roundups on 
in Other Cities, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 4; Shanghai Reports Dissidents' Arrest, 
N.Y. Times, June 11, 1989, § 1, at 8, col. 1. The United States Secretary of State and leaders from 
many other nations lodged strong official protests against the events and executions. See Baker 
Denounces Executions of Chinese Protesters, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1989, at A10, col. 4. 
196. See generally HONG KoNG IN TRANSITION, supra note 21; HONG KONG AND 1997: STRATE· 
GIES FOR THE FuTURE (1985). The Portuguese colony of Macao also returns to China on December 
20, 1999. Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Portugal on the Question of Macao, reprinted in EmcllEs EM LiNGUAS 
ESTRANGEIRAS, DECLARACAO CONJUNTA SINO-PORTUGUESA SOBRE A QUESTAO DE MACAU 59 (1987). 
197. See Reiss, Specter of 1997, NEWSWEEK INT'L, July 3, 1989, at 16, 17; Wong, Hong Kong 
Is Jolted into Grim Visions of Transition in 1997, Asian Wall St. J., June 8, 1989, at 1, col. 3. 
198. See Wu Wen-Cheng & Chen 1-Hsin, Tiananmen Is Also a Tragedy for Taiwan, Asian 
Wall St. J., July 6, 1989, at 8, col. 3. 
199. Kristof, Relations with U.S. Seem Badly Hurt by Crushing of Democracy Protests, 
N.Y. Times, June 11, 1989, § 1, at 16, col. 1. 
200. See China: Now, Where Were We?, NEWSWEEK INT'L, July 3, 1989, at 44; Foreigners 
Scramble to Leaoe Beijing, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1989, at A9, col. 1; Companies Speeding Beijing 
Exodus, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1989, at D7, col. 3. 
201. See Gergen, A Cautious Man Plays China by the Book, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., June 
5, 1989, at 27. 
202. Bush Order May Affect Grumman, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1989, at D7, col. 1; Bush Sus-
pends Sales of Weapons to China, Halts Military Links, Asian Wall St. J., June 6, 1989, at 1, col. 
5. Prior to the Beijing Massacre, expansion of security cooperation with China was being given 
consideration by the United States. See, e.g., H. GAss, SINO-AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONS 1 
(1984). Although President Bush's immediate sanction actions limited military relations and high 
technology exports, subsequent sanctions imposed by the White House in late June included sus-
pension of high-level government exchanges and pressures to postpone new loans from interna-
tional lending institutions. See Bush Imposes More Sanctions Against Beijing, Asian Wall St. J., 
June 21, 1989, at 1, col. 6. 
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ers agreed to impose economic sanctions on China. 203 The flow of for-
eign tourism to China, which had brought in 2.2 billion dollars for 
China in 1988, dried up and remained at only a trickle in the aftermath 
of the incident. 204 
Members of Congress appeared very dissatisfied with the Presi-
dent's measured approach. Several different amendments to the For-
eign Aid Authorization Bill for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 were 
introduced that severely would curtail United States exports of com-
puters, weapons, satellites, and financing to China.200 Thus, the broad 
chasm of disagreement between congressional and presidential percep-
tions of appropriate United States foreign policy toward China evi-
denced by the "Tibet Question" not only continues, but appears to 
have been exacerbated by the 1989 repression. 
VII. THE RoLE OF CoNGREss IN AMERICAN FoREIGN Poucv 
The conventional judicial wisdom holds that the United States 
speaks with one voice on matters of foreign policy through the federal 
government: "'[F]or national purposes, embracing our relations with 
foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.' "206 Un-
fortunately, the federal government too often speaks through two 
voices, that of the President and the Congress, on sensitive foreign af-
fairs issues. The resulting dissonance undermines the effectiveness and 
credibility of American foreign policy. The congressional role in foreign 
relations should be considered; specifically, did Congress usurp presi-
dential powers in foreign relations by its positions on the "Tibet Ques-
tion"? Even if this question has no clear answer, the practical question 
remains whether the best interests of the United States are served 
when Congress disrupts established foreign relation policies of the exec-
utive branch. Consensus clearly exists that the United States possesses 
all the "foreign affairs powers" of a sovereign nation, and that this 
power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty,207 but the debate contin-
203. The decision to halt official and multilateral agency credit to China was the main choice 
of protest the major industrial nations took. An early step was the freezing of $10 billion (United 
States dollars) in aid projects from the World Bank and Japan. The most painful and immediate 
impact came from the World Bank's decision, under pressure from the United States and Europe, 
to freeze loans totaling $780.2 million (United States dollars), which had been slated for approval 
by the end of June. World Bank Forced to Defer China Loans, FAR E. EcoN. REv., July 6, 1989, at 
69. 
204. WuDunn, For the Tourists, an Even More Forbidding City, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1989, 
at A4, col. 3. 
205. Congress, Angry at China, Moves to Impose Sanctions, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1989, at 
A5, col. 1. 
206. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 442 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting The Chi-
nese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889)). 
207. See Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 396 (1933). 
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ues over the proper allocation of the foreign affairs power between the 
legislative and executive branches. Although disagreements between 
these branches over domestic policies are not uncommon, the whole 
world becomes a stage for display of United States governmental 
gridlock when the two branches of government work at cross purposes 
in foreign relations. 
This debate initially started during America's early constitutional 
era, with Alexander Hamilton and James Madison taking sides over 
which branch of government should preside over foreign affairs. The 
Hamilton-Madison dispute over presidential versus congressional pow-
ers in foreign affairs continues to be one of the longest running debates 
in United States constitutional history. Hamilton argued in favor of 
presidential supremacy in foreign affairs. Presidential powers in foreign 
affairs emanate from article II of the Constitution, which contains spe-
cific enumerations of powers, including the power to make treaties, with 
the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate; and to appoint ambassa-
dors, public ministers, and consuls with the Senate's advice and con-
sent. 208 As Commander in Chief, the President clearly has enormous 
influence over the conduct of foreign affairs.108 Hamilton argued that 
the first clause of article II constituted a general grant of power to the 
executive not limited by the specific enumeration of powers which fol-
lowed: "The executive powers shall be vested in a President of the 
United States .... "210 According to Hamilton's theory, any foreign af-
fairs power not specifically granted to Congress under the Constitution 
was reserved to the President through the executive power clause. 211 
Because the early Supreme Court often was reluctant to serve as 
umpire in executive-legislative branch disputes, early assertions of 
power by the President sometimes were approved tacitly by the Court's 
failure to interfere.212 On occasion, the early Congress even appeared to 
share an expansive view of presidential powers. For example, the Sen-
208. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
209. See id. art. II, § 2. 
210. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 179-81 (4th rev. ed. 1957) (citing 7 THE 
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 76 (H. Lodge ed. 1904)). 
211. !d. 
212. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137 (1803). Less than a year later, 
however, Chief Justice Marshall did not even discuss the "political question" option, and held that 
the President's enumerated powers as Commander in Chief of the armed forces did not allow him 
to order seizure of foreign vessels beyond the specific authorization granted by Congress. See Little 
v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). See generally Glennon, Two Views of Presidential For-
eign Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 5 (1988). The debate 
has continued to have contemporary viability. For example, President Nixon vetoed the War Pow-
ers Resolution of Congress as an unconstitutional infringement on his powers as Commander in 
Chief. See 3 T. FRANCK & M. GLENNON, UNITED STATES FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW: DocuMENTS AND 
SouRCEs 125-28 (1981). 
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ate Committee on Foreign Relations stated on February 15, 1816: 
" 'The President is the constitutional representative of the United 
States with regard to foreign nations. He manages our concerns with 
foreign nations . . . . The nature of transactions with foreign nations, 
moreover, requires caution and unity of design, and their success fre-
quently depends on secrecy and dispatch.' "213 
When Congress and the President were in accord, the Court has 
echoed similar language in constitutional disputes il)itiated by third 
parties. For example, in Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Water-
man Steamship Corp.,214 the Court upheld the grant of an overseas air 
route to Chicago & Southern Air Lines and denial of the route to its 
rival, Waterman Steamship Corp., pursuant to an executive order is-
sued under congressional authorization. The Court held that the por-
tion of the order which was based upon presidential powers alone was 
not subject to judicial review: 
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for foreign 
affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not to be 
published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant 
information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on 
information properly held secret .... [T]he very nature of executive decisions as 
to foreign policy is political, not judicial..,. 
The most commonly cited contemporary reference to this type of 
Hamiltonian view is Justice Sutherland's decision in the leading case of 
United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp.,216 in which the Supreme 
Court concluded that: 
[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the 
nation .... As Marshall said in his great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House 
of Representatives, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external 
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."217 
The era spanning the Watergate through the Iran-Contra scandals 
has left little untarnished about the executive image and has resulted in 
greater congressional distrust and assertiveness in foreign affairs and 
other areas that otherwise might be left largely to executive discretion. 
James Madison's original thesis that Congress, and not the President, 
should be dominant in foreign affairs has been revived with a ven-
geance, although the current fervor stops short of congressional de-
mands for total dominance. 
James Madison's position was in direct opposition to Hamilton's; 
213. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (quoting U.S. 
Senate Reports, Committee on Foreign Relations, vol. 8, at 24 (1816)). 
214. 333 u.s. 103 (1948). 
215. /d. at 111. 
216. 299 u.s. 304 (1936). 
217. /d. at 319. 
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Madison asserted that Congress enjoyed broad powers under the ex-
press and implied constitutional grants, and that the President's powers 
in foreign affairs were limited specifically.218 Authority for congressional 
action affecting foreign affairs can be found in several articles of the 
Constitution. Article I, section 8 defines congressional powers broadly: 
"Congress shall have Power to provide for the common Defense, . . . to 
regulate foreign commerce, . . . and to define and punish Piracies and 
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the law of 
Nations."2111 Congress also has the power to declare war, to make rules 
of war, to grant letters of marque and reprisal,220 and to raise, support, 
and regulate an army and a navy. 221 Treaties require approval by two-
thirds of the Senate before ratification, and the Senate is empowered to 
advise the President on the terms of the treaty.222 Finally, international 
postal agreements may be authorized by Congress under the "postal 
power" clause. 223 
In addition to the above specific constitutional grants of congres-
sional power affecting foreign affairs, there are a variety of ways in 
which Congress can interfere with presidential attempts to exercise for-
eign affairs powers. The congressional power over the purse, for exam-
ple, is a very effective means for limiting presidential aspirations in the 
international arena. By exercise of ·congressional powers under the 
"spending power" clause,224 Congress virtually can veto programs essen-
tial to the presidential foreign affairs agenda. One of the most fertile 
sources of congressional power in modern times has been the commerce 
clause,m which continues to be used to regulate United States foreign 
trade. The United States only recently has emerged from a posture of 
relative nonchalance toward world trade matters. The exercise of the 
commerce clause by Congress no doubt will result in ever-increasing in-
fluence over foreign affairs because the United States now faces a highly 
competitive international market and the immediate necessity for ac-
tive participation in that market in order to remain a major player in 
the world economy. The "necessary and proper" clause also has been 
used to control the exercise of presidential foreign affairs power. Article 
I, section 8 provides that Congress has the power "[t]o make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
218. E. CORWIN, supra note 210, at 180-82, 184-85 (citing 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 
138 (G. Hunt ed. 1900)). 
219. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8. 
220. /d. § 8, cl. 11. 
221. /d. § 8, cis. 12, 13. 
222. /d. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 .. 
223. /d. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
224. /d. § 8, cl. l. 
225. /d. § 8, cl. 3. 
36 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
United States or in any Department or Officer thereof."226 
Early Supreme Court decisions recognized congressional power in 
foreign affairs, u 7 and various theories upholding congressional powers 
in foreign affairs have been sustained by contemporary decisions as 
well.2ll8 Even in Curtiss- Wright, the decision so often quoted in support 
of an expansive view of presidential powers, Justice Sutherland ac-
knowledged that the "foreign affairs power" arising from the sovereign 
status of the United States included some congressional authority in 
international matters.••s The Supreme Court has upheld significant for-
eign affairs powers for Congress that are only implied by the Constitu-
tion. For example, ·in Perez v. Brownell,280 the Court sustained a 
congressional exercise of power affecting foreign affairs by upholding 
the Nationality Act of 1940. The Court stated: 
[W)hat is the source of power on which Congress must be assumed to have drawn? 
Although there is in the Constitution no specific grant to Congress of power to 
enact legislation for the effective regulation of foreign affairs, there can be no doubt 
of the existence of this power in the law.making organ of the Nation ... [A] Fed· 
eral Government to conduct the affairs of that nation must be held to have granted 
that Government the powers indispensable to its functioning effectively in the com-
pany of sovereign nations. The Government must be able not only to deal affirma-
tively with foreign nations, . . . [i)t must also be able to reduce to a minimum the 
frictions that are unavoidable in a world of sovereigns sensitive in matters touching 
their dignity and interests. ••• 
Because conflicts over the allocation of foreign affairs powers often 
have been considered by the Supreme Court to constitute a "political 
question," the Hamilton-Madison debate has not been resolved by the 
judicial branch. As stated by Justice Brennan in writing for the Court 
in Baker v. Carr,182 "The conduct of the foreign relations of our Gov-
ernment is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legis-
lative-'the political'-Departments of the Government, and the 
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is 
not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. "233 On occasion, the Court 
has avoided direct intervention in such "political questions," but has 
resolved the matter indirectly by allowing to stand action by the branch 
226. /d. § 8, cl. 18. 
227. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion 
Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
228. See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 182 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968). 
229. 299 U.S. at 318·19. 
230. 356 u.s. 44 (1958). 
231. /d. at 57 (citation omitted). Perez subsequently was overruled on other grounds in 
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 
232. 369 u.s. 186 (1962). 
233. /d. at 211 n.31 (quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)). 
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of government that appears to be acting within the scope of its consti-
tutional authority.234 It cannot be said that Congress has no power to 
enact legislation conditioning United States foreign economic relations 
on the satisfaction of specific congressional requirements. 
To the extent that congressional actions toward China and the Da-
lai Lama constituted recognition of the Dalai Lama as head of the inde-
pendent State of Tibet, however, a good argument can be made that 
Congress exceeded its powers. In United States v. Belmont1111 the Su-
preme Court sustained the presidential exercise of powers in recogniz-
ing a foreign government. The Soviet Union had seized and 
nationalized property of an American corporation within its territories. 
The Soviet Union's appropriation extended to a bank account originally 
held by the American corporation in a New York bank. Pursuant to an 
agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, the Soviet 
Union assigned its rights in the account to the government of the 
United States. When the United States government attempted to col-
lect the money, the bank refused to pay. In the resulting litigation, the 
Supreme Court held for the United States and stated: 
We take judicial notice of the fact that coincident with the assignment set forth in 
the complaint, the President recognized the Soviet government and normal diplo· 
matic relations were established between that government and the Government of 
the United States, followed by an exchange of ambassadors. The effect of this was 
to validate, so far as this country is concerned, all acts of the Soviet Government 
here involved from the commencement of its existence . ... That the negotiations, 
acceptance of the assignment and agreements and understandings in respect 
thereof were within the competence of the President may not be doubted. . .. And 
in respect of what was done here, the Executive had authority to speak as the sole 
organ of that government. The assignment and the agreements in connection there-
with did not, as in the case of treaties, as that term is used in the treaty making 
clause of the Constitution (Art. II, § 2), require the advice and consent of the 
Senate.••• 
The audience accorded to the Dalai Lama before the United States 
Congress in September 1987 was more befitting to a head of state than 
to a religious leader. The Dalai Lama's five point program introduced 
before Congress and strongly supported by some members of Congress, 
as laudable as its goals may be, rightly could be interpreted by China 
and the rest of the world as nothing less than a challenge to China's 
sovereignty in Tibet. Congress improperly received the Dalai Lama as 
the head of the Tibetan government-in-exile to make a "political state-
ment"237 advancing his position that Tibet is an independent state 
234. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 213·14, 449-50 n.26 (1972). 
235. 301 u.s. 324 (1937). 
236. /d. at 330 (emphasis added). 
237. 133 CoNG. REc. E3641 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1987) (remarks of Rep. Tom Lantos). 
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under illegal occupation.288 It was improper not only because it repre-
sented an attempted usurpation of presidential powers to recognize and 
receive foreign heads of state, it also directly contravened all other con-
gressional and executive acts in the continuous pattern of recognition of 
China for more than a decade. 
Undeniably, however, the Congress possesses the power to take 
public positions, as representatives of the American people, on matters 
affecting United States foreign policy. The divergence of opinion be-
tween Congress and the President on certain aspects of the United 
States-China relationship is inevitable, and is not resolved by any inter-
pretation of their respective powers under the Constitution. Rather, it 
is a political problem that must be resolved through political means. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Part of the problem in assessing the events surrounding the "Tibet 
Question" is that the energy expended on the subject generally has pro-
duced more heat than light. The United States Congress focused almost 
exclusively on the highly emotional aspects of human rights with little 
or no apparent effort to separate the political aspirations of the Dalai 
Lama's program from his religious and human rights concerns. The 
Chinese also responded to the congressional accusations from an emo-
tional plane. Chinese authorities appear to have overreacted to the riots 
in Tibet. To the extent that China disregarded fundamental individual 
rights as guaranteed by its own laws in the suppression of those disor-
ders, it rightly may be subjected to world criticism. However, as a sov-
ereign power, it also has the inherent police power to suppress rioting in 
the streets that endangers public order and safety. 
The qu~lity of the facts cited by Congress in House Bill 1777 also 
was poor; most of the allegations related to events that occurred during 
the Cultural Revolution under former leader Mao Zedong, who died in 
1976. The 1987 congressional allegations of human rights abuses had 
little foundation in hard data or information, and seemed to reflect or 
parrot the Dalai Lama's accusations. 
The 1989 Beijing Massacre and China's subsequent acts of repres-
sion are a different matter but clearly exacerbate concerns for the pro-
spective treatment of the Tibetan people. The massacre itself and the 
widespread arrests and executions that followed raise considerable 
doubts about the continued viability of China's ambitious law-making 
efforts of the past ten years,239 in which individual rights and protec-
tions received unprecedented attention. In short, the question of 
238. Proposal for Peace and Accommodation in Tibet-Statement of the Dalai Lama, id. 
239. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. 
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whether the incumbent Deng regime can be counted on to make a sin-
cere commitment to the rule of law is still pending. For many, Beijing 
has lost its credibility. Just before the massacre occurred, Beijing sent a 
message to the Dalai Lama indicating that the Chinese Government 
wanted to discuss the Tibetan situation.240 After the student democracy 
movement was crushed, however, the Dalai Lama expressed reluctance 
to enter such discussions because he was concerned that "the Chinese 
Government may not be the people's government."241 
When the United States has a special relationship with another 
country, such as the special economic relationship that has been devel-
oping with China for more than a decade, the United States should be 
able to communicate its concerns over human rights and other legiti-
mate matters through proper channels without fear of jeopardizing the 
underlying relationship. However, it is important to rationalize the de-
bate over the Tibetan situation by recognizing that there are two re-
lated but severable issues. The human rights question is a matter of 
legitimate concern for the American people and their elected represent-
atives. Involvement in the separatist movement, however, and the polit-
ical programs advocated by the Dalai Lama, are not legitimate roles for 
Congress. Until these issues are clearly identified and dealt with sepa-
rately, legitimate concern over human rights violations in Tibet will be 
diluted. 
The process of institutionalizing the relationship between China 
and the United States has seen remarkable advances during the past 
decade. Those advances were achieved by careful planning, deliberate 
actions, and due regard for the respective sovereign interests of both 
nations. Since the initial United States recognition of the Government 
of the People's Republic of China, Tibet has been considered a part of 
China. No country in the world has recognized Tibet as an independent 
nation, and no country has qualified its recognition of China by an ex-
clusion of the Tibet Autonomous Region. If either the executive or leg-
islative branch chooses to take such a position, that branch has had 
ample opportunity with each successive treaty or intergovernmental 
United States-China agreement to do so. 
The difficulties arising from the "Tibet Question" debate also em-
phasize the need for greater Chinese appreciation of the importance of 
human rights in the free world economic order. In the long term, suc-
cessful economic relations with the United States require the recogni-
tion and observance of fundamental human rights. Otherwise, the 
American people, speaking through both the Congress and the Presi-
240. Dalai Lama Says Beijing Can't Crush Hopes, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1989, at All, col. 1. 
241. /d. 
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dent, will begin to chafe under the relationship. As China, the SoViet 
Union, and other Communist nations seek to modernize their own econ-
omies through an increased opening to the West, it is timely that this 
reality in East-West relations be confronted by the East. 
As an ideological leader in the free world, the United States has an 
obligation to provide leadership in human rights reform. But when that 
leadership is asserted in the form of intervention in the domestic affairs 
of another state, it should be measured, consistent with the goal to be 
accomplished, unassailable in its factual foundations, and coordinated 
through the foreign policy-making channels of government. Just as im-
portantly, the goals of such intervention should be reconciled with the 
United States' overall interests, including geostrategic interests. 
Much of the rancor generated between the United States Congress 
and China by the "Tibet Question" has subsided, but the momentum in 
the developing relationship between the United States and China may 
have cooled as well. The greatest beneficiaries of the unrest in Tibet 
likely were the hard-liners in Beijing who oppose China's current liber-
alization movement.242 The controversy brought to light some funda-
mental truths about relationships between Communist countries and 
the free world. Despite China's economic reforms and opening to the 
West, now followed by the Soviet Union's related version of perestroika 
(restructuring), some very basic differences remain in the way the lead-
ers in our diverse political systems view the relationship between indi-
viduals and the state. China remains essentially an authoritarian nation 
that still does not share many of the values of freedom that are the 
pillars of the United States system of government. Although the eco-
nomic liberalizations in China appeared to have been leading to politi-
cal liberalizations as well, fundamental differences in our two systems 
will remain for a very long time, perhaps forever. At the time of this 
writing, great uncertainty remains over the future directions of China's 
reform movement. The repression begun with the Beijing Massacre con-
tinues to pose the single greatest threat to the maintenance of cordial 
relations between the United States and China. The problems in that 
relationship, from the "Tibet Question" to the present, were exacer-
bated greatly by the Tie~.nanmen Square incident of June 4, 1989, and 
its aftermath. 
The stakes are high for both countries in the United States-China 
relationship, and the long-term success of that relationship requires 
consistency and reliability in our mutual dealings. For the United 
States, it is essential that a coherent, credible, and cohesive United 
242. Kristof, Tibet Unrest Said to Aid Hard-Liners in Beijing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1987, at 
A12, col. 1; see also Unrest Rocks the Calm of "Shangri-La," supra note 1, at 10. 
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States-China policy be developed and observed consistently, with gov-
ernment policy makers speaking with one voice on that policy's funda-
mental aspects. 
POSTSCRIPT 
On December 12, 1989, the Norwegian Nobel Committee 
awarded the Dalai Lama the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize, commenting 
that: "It would be difficult to cite any historical example of a minor-
ity's struggle to secure its rights, in which a more conciliatory attitude 
to the adversary has been adopted than in the case of the Dalai 
Lama."243 In accepting the prize, the Dalai Lama reiterated his Five 
Point Peace Plan for the restoration of peace and human rights in Ti-
bet. 244 The Dalai Lama's approach has remained consistently concili-
atory, despite the leftist retrenchment in China that followed the 
Beijing massacre of June 1989. Meanwhile, the disagreement between 
the United States Congress and the President has reintensified over an 
appropriate United States foreign policy towards China. 
During the period immediately following the Beijing Massacre, 
China's leaders moved quickly to consolidate their control and to im-
pose a new regime of political and economic retrenchment. Politi-
cally, members of China's ultra-conservative "old guard" consolidated 
their power and began to systematically replace or curb the activities 
of reformers. An internal leadership struggle no doubt was intensified 
when Deng Xiaoping went into public seclusion for several months, 
following his June 9, 1989 appearance to congratulate army troops for 
crushing the democracy movement. 245 After Deng's reappearance in 
September, it was announced that Jiang Zemin had been named as 
China's new Communist Party General Secretary to replace the dis-
credited reformer, Zhao Ziyang.246 Formerly the Party Chief in 
Shanghai, Jiang Zemin had led the crackdown on intellectuals in that 
city during the spring 1989 democracy movement. He generally has 
been viewed as a moderate on economic reforms. 247 Jiang quickly 
adopted the conservative party line in his first public contacts with the 
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news media, giving no indication that the current wave of oppression, 
arrests and executions would subside, or that executions of dissident 
students and intellectuals would be ruled out. 248 
On September 13, 1989, it was reported that Chinese courts had 
sentenced ten Tibetans to prison terms ranging from three years to life 
on charges of rioting and spying during the pro-independence unrest 
in Tibet in March, 1989.249 The harshness of these sentences appeared 
to be calculated to discourage similar demonstrations in the future. 
Although the official party line continued to express allegiance to 
the modernization reform movement, Beijing clearly retreated from 
many of the most significant economic reform measures of the past 
decade. Among the key programs which were aborted was decontrol 
of prices, sales of state-owned enterprises, strengthening of the private 
enterprise sector, and encouragement of rural enterprises. 250 
It soon became clear that China was locked into a period of se-
vere economic austerity, with diminishing tourism and foreign trade, 
and domestic budget shortages that threatened to create new political 
discontent. China braced for the most severe foreign trade slump in a 
decade. 251 Steep wage cuts were ordered; many employees were paid 
in part with a new kind of three-year interest-paying bond; unemploy-
ment was rising; and labor productivity was falling. 252 China's central 
bank issued an emergency loan of more than five billion dollars to help 
local banks avoid a recurrence of the government's inability in 1988 to 
pay farmers for their crops. 253 Fears of a major economic recession 
mounted as industry output slowed to the lowest point in ten years, in 
a climate of falling sales and rising prices. 254 
By early November, 1989, it was reported that the Beijing govern-
ment had adopted a new economic program which assured increased 
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political and economic centralization. 255 One of the victims of the new 
program was the robust and growing private enterprise sector in 
China, which was made the subject of a sweeping nationwide crack-
down in late fall, 1989.256 Under the new guidelines, domestic invest-
ment was practically called to a halt.257 The booming coastal towns in 
China, often the showcases of economic reform, were hit the hardest 
by the economic retrenchment. 258 The austerity program made it in-
creasingly difficult for foreign firms still operating in China, 259 and in-
vestors complained of increased interference with foreign investment 
enterprises by Party cadres. 260 
The confidence of foreign investors clearly was shaken by the 
events in China during 1989.261 In an effort to restore investor confi-
dence, China's Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
renewed discussions of possible reform of the Joint Venture Law.262 
In late December, 1989, the Minister of Foreign Economic Relations 
and Trade explained that three proposed changes were under consid-
eration: (1) new guarantees against nationalization or expropriation of 
joint venture enterprises, (2) an end to the Chinese partner's exclusive 
right to appoint the chairman of the joint venture's board of directors, 
and (3) a liberalization of the rules currently limiting the duration of 
joint ventures. 263 
Throughout 1989, the China-United States relationship was 
tense. Soon after the conservative leadership asserted its control, Bei-
jing announced a major shift in policy, permitting fewer Chinese stu-
255. Leung, Beijing Maps Radical Economic Program, Asian Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1989, 
at I, col. 3. 
256. WuDunn, China Cracks Down on Private Work, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1989, at 3, 
col. 4. 
257. Beijing is Reasserting Centralized Control, Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1989, at AIO, col. I. 
258. WuDunn, China Feels the Cuts in its Economy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1989, at 26, 
col. I. 
259. Ignatius, Austerity Hobbles Foreign Firms in China, Asian Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 
1989, at I, col. 3. 
260. Leung, Return of "Big Brother" Irks China's Investors, Asian Wall St. J., Dec. 28, 
1989, at 9, col. 3. 
261. The foreign investment community already had serious concerns with the long-
term profitability of investment in China. For an in-depth study of the experiences of a 
major manufacturing enterprise investment in China by a United States automaker through 
the events of summer 1989, see J. Mann, Beijing Jeep-The Short, Unhappy Romance of 
American Business in China (1990). 
262. See China Prepares Joint Venture Law Changes, 12 East Asian Exec. Rep. No. I, at 
4 (Jan. 15, 1990). 
263. /d. 
44 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
dents to study in the United States.264 In early November, the United 
States Congress approved a package of sanctions against China to pro-
test the crackdown on the democracy movement, including suspension 
of trade assistance and an end to insurance for American companies 
doing business in China. 265 The sanctions also froze exports of satel-
lites, controlled munitions (e.g., helicopters), and certain nuclear ma-
terial and components. China reacted to the sanctions by expressing 
"utmost indignation."266 
A visit to China by former President Richard Nixon, who re-
ported back to President Bush, failed to ease the growing tensions be-
tween China and the United States.267 Deng Xiaoping's response to 
Mr. Nixon's overtures was that "the U.S. was involved too deeply in 
the turmoil and counterrevolutionary rebellion that occurred in Bei-
jing. . . . China was the real victim and it is unjust to reprove China 
for it. . . . It is up to the U.S. to take the initiative."268 
In early December, 1989, President Bush took a calculated risk 
by sending his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, to China 
in an effort to improve relations with Beijing. Soon thereafter, infor-
mation was leaked disclosing that the President had sent Scowcroft on 
an earlier trip to Beijing in July, soon after the Beijing Massacre and in 
violation of the President's own ban on high-level official visits. 269 
Later in December, President Bush approved the sale of three Ameri-
can-made satellites to be launched on Chinese rockets, and waived re-
strictions on financing for China by the U.S. Export-Import Bank.270 
During this same period, China's conservative leaders appeared 
to harden their positions in response to the political liberalization in 
Eastern Europe. Beijing reportedly was particularly shocked by the 
revolution in Rumania. 271 Nevertheless, in an apparent effort to ap-
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pease foreign critics, especially in the U.S., China lifted martial law in 
early January 1990.272 Thereafter, China announced that it was free-
ing 573 people who had been imprisoned for taking part in the democ-
racy movement. 273 President Bush hailed the lifting of martial law in 
China as "a very sound step,"274 but he appeared to find little support 
in Congress. 
Throughout late 1989 and early 1990, the focal point of the 
heated presidential-congressional policy conflict was H.R. 2712, the 
Emergency Chinese Adjustment of Status Facilitation Act of 1989.275 
Essentially, H.R. 2712 waived the two-year home country and physi-
cal presence period requirements under the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act276 for Chinese nationals holding a "J" visa and present in the 
United States on the date of enactment. The dilemma posed to Presi-
dent Bush was that the bill would inflame Beijing's growing anti-
American sentiment at a time when he was taking a measured ap-
proach to reestablish normal relations with China, and attempting to 
obtain China's cooperation on other critical foreign policy fronts, such 
as negotiations for a permanent settlement of the Cambodian conflict. 
On November 30, 1989, the President issued a memorandum dis-
approving H.R. 2712, citing the need to preserve his ability to manage 
foreign relations. 277 The President concluded that H.R. 2712 was un-
necessary because of his earlier administrative actions taken on June 
5th, immediately after the Beijing Massacre, and action he was taking 
on November 30, 1989, to direct the Attorney General and the Secre-
tary of State to provide additional protections to certain Chinese na-
tionals in the United States.278 
On January 24, 1990, the President was sharply rebuffed by a 
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392-25 vote in the House to override his pocket veto of H.R. 2712.279 
Following an extensive lobbying effort by the President, and a lengthy 
debate in the Senate, 280 the Senate failed to gather sufficient votes to 
override the President's veto.281 On January 30, 1990, the Senate 
unanimously approved legislation that included a series of economic 
sanctions against China, but reserved to the President wide discretion 
to waive those sanctions if he considers it in the national interest to do 
so.2s2 
Efforts by President Bush to use moderation in dealing with the 
current Chinese regime will be made more difficult by the announce-
ment on February 3, 1990, that a confidential State Department report 
concludes that there were pervasive and severe violations of human 
rights in Beijing, Tibet and other parts of China during 1989.283 The 
study reportedly was reviewed by White House officials, but was not 
watered down on the assumption that any effort at censorship would 
cause an additional uproar.284 
In the context of these events, it now seems highly unlikely that 
Chinese officials, who strongly resent even mild criticism, will give 
very much attention to the Tibet question for some time to come. This 
is particularly true in light of the larger issues they now face, both 
domestically and in China's foreign relations. The pattern of political 
and economic retrenchment that was established throughout late 1989 
and early 1990 likely will not be reversed unless there is a major 
change in China's top leadership. A political revolution from within 
the Party seems remote as long as Deng Xiaoping lives; the gerontoc-
racy ruling China remains very much under the influence of this dura-
ble patriarch. Although Deng resigned in November, 1989, from his 
last official post, the chairmanship of the Central Military Commis-
sion, and relinquished control over that commission to Jiang Zemin, 
he clearly remains the de facto ruler of the nation. 285 Although it ap-
pears that Jiang Zemin is the heir-apparent tapped by Deng, it is not 
yet clear whether Jiang's support extends much beyond his mentor. 
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Other elderly conservative leaders who share considerable power 
are Chen Yun, a highly influential conservative economist; and Yang 
Shangkun, the most powerful person in the military, and one viewed 
by many as a possible successor to Deng Xiaoping as paramount 
leader.286 In November, 1989, Mr. Yang's brother, Yang Baibing, was 
elevated to the position of Secretary General of the Central Military 
Commission and to a position in the Party's Secretariat. 287 Another 
military hardliner, Liu Huaqing, was appointed as the military com-
mission's vice-chairman.288 
As China enters the last decade of the twentieth century, it ad-
dresses one of Chinese Communism's most serious crises. That crisis 
has engulfed the United States' foreign policy-making apparatus in an 
intense presidential-congressional conflict as well. Predictions about 
the political future of China can be speculative at best in this climate 
of uncertainty, but the groundswell of democratic sentiment in China 
likely will resurface. One of the most famous contemporary Chinese 
dissidents, Wei Jingsheng, was arrested during the spring 1978 democ-
racy demonstrations and continues to serve a fifteen-year sentence in 
prison. In one of his most famous articles, Mr. Wei describes "The 
Fifth Modernization-Democracy."289 Inevitably, as the walls of to-
talitarianism and communism continue to rapidly crumble throughout 
the world, China risks standing alone as an isolated behemoth of out-
dated Stalinist methods unless it combines political reform with eco-
nomic reform. The only way it can modernize and remain in the 
ranks of respected nations is to address the democratic imperative of 
its people. 
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